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Toward Separation of Powers Realism 
David Zaring† 
Many wonder if the separation of powers is going to be reinvigorated by 
the new appointees to the federal judiciary. But that doctrine in practice means 
that occasionally alarming, but exceedingly rare, doctrinal innovations—
finding venerable parts of the administrative state or portions of high-profile 
congressional statutes to be unconstitutional, for example—make no real-world 
difference because of the modest remedies paired with those innovations. This 
Article shows how weak the separation of powers doctrines have become; 
explains how, in the rare case that the doctrines require a remedy, the remedy 
is almost never what the plaintiff seeks or a constraint on the administrative 
state; and analyzes why judges of every ideological stripe have turned away 
from the doctrine. It adds a comprehensive study of the past two decades of 
practice by the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit to the existing literature and 
argues that we would be better off abandoning efforts to reinvigorate the 
functional versions of the doctrines. 
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“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.”—Chief Justice John Marshall1 
Introduction 
Many observers have bemoaned the way that the rise of the administrative 
state has grown into something that is hard to square with the Constitution, 
which came into force before there was an administrative state.2 
The complaints are various. Some object to the rise of the presidency, 
with power over government functions unimaginable to the Founders, from the 
regulation of pollution to the production of low-income housing.3 Others point 
to the independent agencies—the central bank, the securities and 
communications regulators—that are insulated from the president’s control and 
ask where they fit into the tripartite system of government contemplated by the 
Constitution.4 Still others believe that the powers separated by our founding 
 
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
2. Jerry Mashaw has convincingly refuted the notion that administrative law began only in 
1890, with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Rather, Mashaw suggests, the 
administrative state has existed “[f]rom the earliest days of the Republic.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering 
American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260 (2006) 
(“From the earliest days of the Republic, Congress delegated broad authority to administrators, armed 
them with extrajudicial coercive powers, created systems of administrative adjudication, and provided 
for judicial review of administrative action.”). But what did exist—four departments and few career 
offices—looked nothing like the modern federal administrative state, which employs 2.1 million civilian 
workers. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43590, FEDERAL WORKFORCE STATISTICS SOURCES: OPM AND 
OMB 6 (2019). 
3. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1346, 1375 (1994) (“Others, myself included, continue to see an imperial Presidency.”); Thomas 
W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2097, 2148 (2004) (discussing concerns that complacent judges could be “paving the way for an 
all-powerful Executive Leviathan”). Such claims are hoary chestnuts of administrative and constitutional 
law. See, e.g., ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 418 (1973) (“[W]hat kept a 
strong President constitutional, in addition to checks and balances incorporated within his own breast, 
was the vigilance of the nation.”); Robert M. Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 
47 YALE L.J. 577, 577 (1938) (critics of the administrative state spoke of the “tyranny” and “despotism” 
of bureaucrats). Senator Henry Cabot Lodge believed that strong judges were required to prevent “an all 
powerful executive” from “depriv[ing] the representative bodies of all responsibility and turn[ing] them 
into mere machines of record.” HENRY CABOT LODGE, The Public Opinion Bill, in THE DEMOCRACY OF 
THE CONSTITUTION: AND OTHER ADDRESSES AND ESSAYS 1, 9 (1915). For a critique of these concerns, 
see Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2017). 
4. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (1994) (“The claim made by unitary executivists that the Constitution 
creates only three branches of government and that the President must be able to control the execution of 
all federal laws is easily understood and resonates strongly with the very earliest lessons we learn about 
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document have been irredeemably mixed in our agencies.5 Whatever their 
compliant, to these critics, as Chief Justice John Roberts has put it, “the danger 
posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”6 
At first glance, it looks like courts are not dismissing that danger, 
especially these days. The Supreme Court this term heard a claim that a board 
created to take Puerto Rico through a quasi-bankruptcy had been 
unconstitutionally appointed—a case that could strike a newly created agency 
out of existence.7 That very same day, four Justices objected to the way a 
federal sex-offender-registration statute had been implemented by the Attorney 
General.8 Three of them argued that the statute delegated too much legislative 
power to the Department of Justice, an executive-branch body, and a fourth 
stated that in different context, he “would support th[eir] effort” to reinvigorate 
such constraints over the discretion of executive branch officials.9 Justice 
 
our constitutional system.”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41, 43 
(stating that independent agencies are “exceedingly difficult to reconcile with a tripartite structure of 
government”); Julian E. Zelizer, The Conservative Embrace of Presidential Power, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 499, 
499 (2008) (“[C]onservatives add that the gradual delegation of authority to independent agencies has 
resulted in unaccountable bureaucrats making big decisions that are beyond the control of elected 
officials.”); Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 
(1988); see also In re Aiken Cty., 645 F.3d 428, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2011), subsequent mandamus 
proceeding, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.) (claiming that “from communications 
regulation (the FCC) to labor regulation (the NLRB) to securities regulation (the SEC) to nuclear power 
regulation (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) . . . those independent agencies are democratically 
unaccountable”). These claims are also longstanding, of course. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 
487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The rise of administrative bodies . . . has deranged our three-
branch legal theories.”); Robert E. Cushman, The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory 
Commissions (pts. 1 & 2), 24 CORNELL L.Q. 13 (1938), 24 CORNELL L.Q. 163 (1939). 
5. Most regulators pass rules of general applicability and future effect; such rules are of the 
same character as congressional legislation. Agencies also investigate whether those rules have been 
violated—a prosecutorial role and, as Justice Scalia observed, “a quintessentially executive function.” 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). If the agency concludes that there 
has been a violation, it will conduct an adjudication and impose a penalty—proceedings that mirror the 
judicial function. See WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 23-24 (4th Ed. 
2014). 
6. City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Or, as 
Gary Lawson has put it, “the modern administrative state openly flouts almost every important structural 
precept of the American constitutional order.” Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative 
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1994); see also Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1187 (2016). 
7. See United States v. Aurelius Inv., LLC 139 S. Ct. 2737 (2019) (granting certiorari). As of 
the last writing, it had heard argument on the case, but had not decided it. For a review of the argument, 
see Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Weigh Appointments Dispute – And Nature Of Puerto Rico 
Oversight Board, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/argument-
analysis-justices-weigh-appointments-dispute-and-nature-of-puerto-rico-oversight-board 
[https://perma.cc/WJ8E-PFKD]. 
8. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019). 
9. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J. concurring); id. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has 
upheld statutes that allow federal agencies to resolve even highly consequential details so long as 
Congress prescribes the rule governing private conduct. But it’s hard to see how the statute before us 
could be described as leaving the Attorney General with only details to dispatch.”). 
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Kavanaugh, who recused himself from the case, is thought to be sympathetic to 
the cause of the on-the-record four.10 
Nor is the action confined to the most recent term of the Supreme Court. In 
2018, the Court ruled that the way that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) conducted its administrative adjudications was unconstitutional.11 In 2014, it 
struck down a congressional statute for impermissibly interfering with the 
President’s conduct of foreign affairs.12 In 2010, it changed the job protections 
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board enjoyed for 
constitutional reasons (PCAOB).13 
Last year, Justice Kavanaugh concluded, when he was Judge Kavanaugh of 
the D.C. Circuit, that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) enjoyed 
so much independence that it was unconstitutional, in what he said was “a case 
about executive power and individual liberty.”14 The constitutionality of the CFPB 
and agencies structured like it, like the Federal Housing Finance Agency, is a 
question that the Court is taking up this term, as four circuit courts are addressing 
or have addressed cases on the matter.15 
That all sounds like a lot. It might even appear to show that separation of 
powers doctrines really matter to the new generation of appellate judges and 
justices, at least when it comes to taming the administrative state. 
But the separation of powers is one of those doctrines of the future whose 
present never seems to arrive, either on the merits or at the remedial stage. After all, 
 
10. So many observers concluded after Justice Kavanaugh wrote that “Justice Gorsuch’s 
thoughtful Gundy opinion raised important points that may warrant further consideration in future 
cases.” Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019); see, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Brett Kavanaugh Is 
Ready to Join the Supreme Court’s Conservatives to Tear Down Key Federal Regulations, SLATE (Nov. 
25, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/11/kavanaugh-nondelegation-gundy-supreme-
court.html [https://perma.cc/6J97-NG9J]; see also Julie Suk Gersen The Supreme Court Is One Vote 
Away from Changing How the U.S. Is Governed, THE NEW YORKER, July 3, 2019, 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-supreme-court-is-one-vote-away-from-changing-
how-the-us-is-governed [https://perma.cc/SP5K-9924] (“Kavanaugh’s absence from the case [Gundy] 
likely changed its outcome”). 
11. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
12. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
13. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513-14 (2010). 
14. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc, 
881 F.3d 75, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
15. For a report on the current state of play regarding the constitutionality of the CFPB, see 
Alan S. Kaplinsky, DOJ Agrees CFPB is Unconstitutional but Opposes Grant of Certiorari in State 
National Bank of Big Spring Case, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/doj-agrees-cfpb-unconstitutional-opposes-grant-certiorari-state-
national-bank-big [https://perma.cc/JBF9-CFCA] (“Despite agreeing on the merits with State National 
Bank of Big Spring (SNB) and the other petitioners for certiorari that the CFPB’s structure is 
unconstitutional, the Department of Justice has filed a brief in which it argues that the U.S. Supreme 
Court should deny the petition.”). The pending challenges are before the Fifth and Second Circuits; the 
D.C. and Ninth Circuits have upheld the constitutionality of the agency. For a discussion, see Jessica 
Ring Amundson, No Circuit Split Yet on Constitutionality of CFPB, LEXOLOGY (May 7, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ba3c130e-be2b-4937-a69c-ced02f999483 
[https://perma.cc/2HEV-PCMU]. The Fifth Circuit held the FHFA to be unconstitutionally structured in 
Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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the sex-offender regulatory scheme that drew those four-pointed constitutional 
inquiries survived judicial review, and it was novel only because it was a close 
case.16 I collected every separation of powers case heard in the last 20 years by the 
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit. In 42 separation of powers challenges heard 
by the D.C. Circuit in that period, only 4 were ultimately successful, and only two 
of those struck down a statute on its face.17 At the Supreme Court, which chooses 
its own cases, separation of powers claims are increasingly prevalent, but of the 13 
times the Court has analyzed the doctrines, only once has it given plaintiffs the 
relief they sought.18  
If anything, the rise of the administrative state, rather than creating fertile 
grounds for separation of powers plaintiffs, has, with its weight and importance, 
made the courts more inhospitable to those claims. In the 1,309 cases in which the 
Supreme Court reviewed congressional action between 1794 and 2018, 162 have 
involved a separation of powers challenge.19 Of those, 41 have been successful, on 
either an as applied or a facial challenge—a challenging-but-not-impossible 25% 
success rate.20 In other words, up until 20 years ago plaintiffs won 25% of the time. 
In past 20 years, the success rate has fallen to about 8%. 
But it is those rare times when separation of powers cases succeed that things 
get even more interesting. For when it comes to finding a remedy for the assorted 
constitutional problems with our regulatory apparatus, the courts have fallen over 
themselves to assure everyone that unconstitutional agency powers should continue 
to be exercised almost exactly as before. The plaintiffs in the SEC and the PCAOB 
cases found themselves in the same situations they were in before their lawsuits.21 
If the CFPB ever is held to be unconstitutional, then-Judge Kavanaugh promised 
that his preferred fix would “not affect the ongoing operations” of the Bureau.22 In 
Buckley v. Valeo, one of the very few cases that struck an agency out of existence, 
the Supreme Court gave legal effect to every decision the Federal Election 
 
16. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019). (“[I]t is small wonder that we have 
almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy 
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”). 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See id. The Court held that the line item veto violated the bicameralism and presentment 
clauses, a clear win for the plaintiffs. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The only other 
statute struck down on its face, requiring the State Department to treat American passports issued in 
Israel in a particular way, was struck down in the manner sought by the administrative state. Zivotofsky 
v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1059 (2014). 
19. I reviewed the Judicial Review of Congress database and sorted all of the cases that raised 
separation of powers challenges from those that reviewed congressional action on some other ground. 
Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Database, PRINCETON (May 5, 2019), 
https://scholar.princeton.edu/kewhitt/publications/judical-review-congress-database 
[https://perma.cc/2HDG-9MEY]. 
20. I sorted successful separation of powers challenges from failed ones in the database. See 
id. 
21. See infra notes 136, 123 and accompanying text. 
22. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc, 
881 F.3d 75, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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Commission had made because its unconstitutional makeup “should not affect the 
validity of the Commission’s administrative actions and determinations to this 
date.”23 It also kept the agency in business until Congress could fix the separation 
of powers problems with the original construction of the regulator.24 
Accordingly, while Chief Justice Roberts, among others, has suggested that 
the modern administrative state is due for a reckoning under reinvigorated 
separation of powers doctrines, the reality is quite different. There has been a 
campaign to articulate some standards about a right but to almost never pair it with 
a remedy. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that 
liberty meant the “right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury.”25 Modern separation of powers jurisprudence 
does the opposite. Daryl Levinson has argued that this is often a feature of 
constitutional law—that the connection between right and remedy is often tenuous, 
as somewhat philosophical values are hard to translate into a practical idiom.26 But 
with separation of powers cases, the philosophical values are often hard to discern 
and the disjuncture between right and remedy particularly tangible. 
The hollow remedies, even more than the rare findings of constitutional 
violations, are the most interesting aspects of separation of powers jurisprudence. 
They raise one of the enduring mysteries of the federal judiciary: why hold a 
government program to be unconstitutional if you aren’t going to do anything about 
it? 
The answer tells us something about the interplay between constitutional and 
administrative law, an interplay in which constitutional law is increasingly taking a 
back seat. The Constitution, to today’s small-government judges, is a remedy of 
last resort to be used when other legal options fail. So far, the courts seem to be 
implying that those other options have not failed. Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) relief is broadly available to those aggrieved by particular actions of the 
administrative state, and it is also targeted and cabined.27 APA remedies create a 
back and forth between courts and agencies. Businesses and individuals are used to 
planning for those remedies. Congress always has an opportunity to check judicial 
 
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-55, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
24. Id. 
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
26. Constitutional law “assumes a process of constitutional adjudication that begins with 
judicial identification of a pure constitutional value. The pure value is then corrupted by being forced 
into a remedial apparatus that translates the right into an operational rule applied to the facts of the real 
world.” Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and the Remedial Equilibrium, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 
858 (1999). 
27. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (2018). For a similar sort of argument, see Daniel Walters, The 
Judicial Role in Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion: The Virtues of an APA 
Approach, 164 PA. L. REV. 1911 (2016). 
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oversight or goad agency action if it wants progress in a particular area and believes 
that progress has been frustrated by reluctant rule-makers or APA review.28 
Constitutional remedies, on the other hand, cannot be overruled by Congress, 
and, unless carefully constrained, “salt the earth,” killing adjacent innovations in 
public administration as well as the complained-of practice.29 While APA review 
stalls rules, constitutional remedies risk eliminating whole agencies or longstanding 
mechanisms on which many different agencies rely to make policy.30 
Such constitutional remedies are accordingly unpredictable, and, for that 
reason, not small-c conservative. Even if judges may consider rethinking the 
extreme desuetude into which separation of powers merits claims have fallen, they 
are also confronted by precedents that ensure separation of powers doctrines never 
do any damage. These include a vigorous severability practice and a recommitment 
to the de facto officer doctrine.31 
In what follows, I discuss the doctrines and the stakes of separation of powers 
disputes, and then review every case in the past twenty years taken up by the 
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit, the nation’s premier administrative court, with 
an eye to revealing just how modest the relief offered in these cases has been. As 
we will see in Part II of this Article, the number of modern cases awarding serious 
relief to separation of powers plaintiffs can be counted on one hand and are 
outstripped by those cases where successful plaintiffs have won, essentially, 
nothing. By the same token, the doctrines underlying separation of powers claims 
have, in most cases, made a finding of liability quite rare, as I show in Part I. 
Part III applies these insights to all the separation of powers cases decided by 
the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit in an effort to convince the reader that my 
claims are not based on cherry-picked examples. Part IV concludes the paper with 
an elaboration of the argument that the separation of powers doctrines are such 
weak tea because there are better alternatives out there. Although the main 
contribution of the paper is to make clear just how weak the doctrines and remedies 
of the separation of powers have become, Part IV also suggests a modest doctrinal 
prescription. Courts should make clear that they will apply separation of powers 
law only to formal violations—putting sitting members of Congress in the 
 
28. For example, Congress held hearings in an effort to get the Federal Trade Commission to 
investigate gasoline prices, an effort that led to the decision in FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 
449 U.S. 232 (1980); see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (holding, 
in a non-APA contest, after a Supreme Court decision time-barring a gender-discrimination claims, that 
Congress eliminated the time bar in the Lilly Ledbetter Act). 
29. As Justice White observed, sweeping separation of powers remedies have real 
consequences. “Courts should always be wary of striking statutes as unconstitutional; to strike an entire 
class of statutes based on consideration of a somewhat atypical and more-readily indictable exemplar of 
the class is irresponsible.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 974 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
30. For example, although the decision was extremely narrow, the Supreme Court’s 
intervention on ALJs could have dissuaded agencies from making policy through formal adjudications, a 
currently unpopular but classic mechanism on which agencies like the National Labor Relations Board 
almost exclusively rely. 
31. See infra Section I.D for a discussion of these doctrines. 
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leadership of federal agencies, for example, or on Article III courts—rather than 
functional efforts to police how the executive’s take-care powers are to be 
distinguished from the legislature’s role as the maker of rules.32 
I. Modern Problems and the Separation of Powers on the Merits 
The intuition behind separation of powers lawsuits is that by creating 
institutions that are not responsive to either the President or Congress, 
lawmakers have failed to honor the formal allocation of responsibilities set 
forth in the Constitution to the various parts of the government. Moreover, to 
formalists, defending that allocation makes good sense.33 Muddying who can 
exercise which powers is likely to reduce the accountability, and perhaps also 
the expertise, of the government as a whole.34 
However, the doctrines of separation of powers relevant to the 
administrative state have struggled to deal with the complexities of modern 
governance. This Part of the Article reviews the relevant separation of powers 
doctrines, the challenges posed by modernity to them, and how the courts have 
sought to devise tests that maintain separation of powers principles while 
accepting the realities of the modern bureaucratic state. For the most part, 
courts have decided to defang the doctrines, rather than to dismantle the 
bureaucracy. This review will be familiar to those well versed in the separation 
of powers doctrines, who may wish to turn to the novel claims made in Parts II 
and III. 
A. Presidential Autonomy’s Few Protectors 
Some of the ways that the Constitution separates executive power from 
the other branches of government are specific, like the Appointments Clause. 
Other presidential protections have been mined from the more amorphous Take 
Care and Vesting Clauses. Although all of these components of Article II could 
be interpreted to place portions of the administrative state under the sole control 
of the President, they have instead been interpreted to make clear that the 
President’s executive authority can be substantially limited by Congress. 
The Appointments Clause, for example, has been interpreted to require 
that government officials with real clout be placed in office through a process 
 
32. I read some other scholars as also proposing that we give up the ghost on functional 
separation of powers remedies. See Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 
IND. L.J. 665, 711-13 (2016); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1943-45 (2011). 
33. To the extent that formalists care about good or bad sense in the law, of course. 
34. As the Supreme Court has put it, “By diffusing federal powers among three different 
branches, and by protecting each branch against incursions from the others, the Framers devised a 
structure of government that promotes both liberty and accountability.” Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. 
Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
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that involves politically accountable oversight. The mechanism for oversight 
differs among officials. Appointment of “Officers of the United States”—who 
wield “significant authority”—requires “presidential selection and confirmation 
by the Senate.35 “[I]nferior officers,” must be appointed by the President, the 
head of a department, or court.36 The idea, as the Office of Legal Counsel has 
put it, is that limiting the ways that powerful officials can be appointed makes 
the appointment process more transparent and the appointers and appointees 
more accountable.37 Cabinet officials and other important officers (and not so 
important officers, for example, the ambassador to Slovenia) must be 
confirmed by the Senate. Other officers who supervise others yet are also 
supervised by Officers of the United States might count as inferior officers, and 
so cannot be appointed through the ordinary civil service process.38 
The clause may have been easy enough to apply for a government with 
hundreds of employees and only four departments.39 But the size of the modern 
administrative state has posed challenges for the application of the clause. 
Inferior officers in particular are hard to define, given that many government 
officials can point to a supervisor and also to decisions, often momentous ones, 
that are almost always left to their discretion. 
Jennifer Mascott has argued, on originalist grounds, that under the 
Appointments Clause, a panoply of government officials should be deemed to 
exercise substantial authority: “(i) officials overseeing federal disaster relief 
preparations; (ii) tax collectors; (iii) officials authorizing federal benefits 
payments; (iv) contract specialists, (v) federal law enforcement officers; (vi) 
officials responsible for government investigations, audits, or cleanup; and (vii) 
 
35. Under Article II of the Constitution, “The President . . . shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.” 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1976), (“any appointee 
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an “Officer of the United 
States,” and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed”). 
36. The power to appoint “inferior” officers must be vested “in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Id. The Supreme Court has never precisely explained 
what exactly makes a government official a principal officer of the United States needing Senate 
confirmation, or an inferior officer, or mere employee (who does not need confirmation). See, e.g., 
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“The line between ‘mere’ employees and 
inferior officers is anything but bright.”); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: 
Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. 
REV. 62, 72 n.26 (1990) (“The reach of the Appointments Clause, however, is unclear.”). 
37. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. 
O.L.C. 73, 75 (2007), https://www.justice.gov/file/451191/download [https://perma.cc/4JN8-3695]. 
38. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) (“‘Inferior Officers’ are officers whose 
work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”). Perhaps the ordinary civil-service process can be used to 
identify a potential office holder, whose appointment would then be made by the President, a court, or 
the head of a department. 
39. As Richard Fallon has observed, “George Washington had no White House staff. His four-
member Cabinet oversaw no bureaucracy.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitution Day Lecture: American 
Constitutionalism, Almost (but Not Quite) Version 2.0, 65 ME. L. REV. 77, 83 (2012). 
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ALJs.”40 Most of these officials have obtained their positions via the ordinary 
civil-service path, rather than through appointment and confirmation by 
politicians or judges. If such officials did have to go through the process 
stipulated by the Appointments Clause, appointments would quickly exhaust 
congressional, presidential, and department head time and energy. 
Along the same lines, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has 
explained, officials in the Senior Executive Service (SES), “operate and 
oversee nearly every government activity in approximately 75 Federal 
agencies.”41 One third of these bureaucrats manage $100 million programs, or 
oversee more than 200 employees.42 The 5 division directors of the SEC, for 
example, are SES officials.43 The vast majority of these officials obtained their 
positions through a competitive process administered by OPM and their own 
agency, rather than being appointed by the President with or without Senate 
confirmation, the head of a department, or a court, or some other process 
designed to ensure that officials politically aligned with the President occupy 
important positions at the agencies subject to his control.44 
Judges have responded to this reality by asking whether powerful 
government bureaucrats are supervised by politically appointed officials.45 This 
supervision is meant to vindicate the principle of democratic accountability by 
placing at the top of the administrative state’s various tentacles those whom the 
people have chosen, or at least officials chosen by the officials chosen by the 
people.46 But, of course, this has left the vast majority of the administrative 
state outside the purview of the Appointments Clause. 
 
40. Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 454 
(2018). 
41. Senior Executive Service, OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT. (2020), https://www.opm.gov/policy-
data-oversight/senior-executive-service [https://perma.cc/P4P9-REJC]. For a somewhat dated critique of 
the function of the SES, see Developments in the Law: The Civil Service and the Statutory Law of Public 
Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1619, 1647 (1984). 
42. Nora Kelly, Can the Government Fix Its Corps of Managers?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 11, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/senior-executive-service/423435 
[https://perma.cc/LQQ4-LZHX]. 
43. See John H. Walsh, SEC Regulation of Foreign-Domiciled Investment Advisers: A Study of 
the Policy Vision Inspiring the Unibanco Letter, 7 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 233, 236 n.23 (2018). And of 
course, countless other important SES officials may be identified. For example the Vice-Chair of the 
Board of Veterans Appeals is also a member of the SES. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, 
Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1111, 1238 (2000) (describing the arrangement). 
44. Senior Executive Service, supra note 41. 
45. As the Court explained, “in the context of a Clause designed to preserve political 
accountability relative to important Government assignments, we think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ 
are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by 
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 
651, 663 (1997). 
46. Id. 
10. ZARING ARTICLE. PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020 11:19 PM 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:708, 2020 
718 
The Take Care Clause, another workhorse in separation of powers 
jurisprudence, works in a similar, if more amorphous, way.47 By assigning the 
faithful execution of laws to the President, the Constitution provides that 
Congress cannot give executive powers to someone else, ensuring that, as the 
Court has put it, the “buck stops” with the President.48 One implication of the 
Clause concerns removal: as Chief Justice Roberts has said, the “President 
cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the 
faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”49 Ensuring that the President 
has the power to remove and replace recalcitrant bureaucrats with employees 
who support her program is one way to guarantee faithful execution. 
The Vesting Clause also has been invoked to protect presidential 
privileges, including the privilege to replace officers in the executive branch 
with officers more to his liking. It provides that the “executive power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States,” and while lawyers have long 
debated the Clause’s exact meaning, it does, at a minimum, assign 
responsibility for the execution of the laws to the President.50 As with the Take 
Care Clause, the Vesting Clause could be thwarted if civil-service protections 
and the structure of agencies mean that officials who do not respond to 
presidential direction are the ones executing the laws in their particular issue-
area.51 The Vesting Clause was cited as the basis for the President’s removal 
power in Myers v. United States,52 a high-water mark of separation of powers 
jurisprudence. 
But the modern application of the removal power covers a tiny number of 
politically appointed officials.53 The heads of independent agencies can only be 
removed for cause, meaning that the President has no functional ability to take 
action against these officials.54 Senior Executive Service officials also enjoy 
 
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed”). 
48. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010). 
49. Id. 
50. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
51. For an excellent analysis of what the Vesting Clause would have meant to the Framers, see 
Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1169, 1172 (2019). 
52. 272 U.S. 52, 115 (1926). 
53. For-cause removal protections were approved by the Supreme Court in Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The Supreme Court now infers those protections for all 
independent agencies, regardless of the statutory language. Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 487 (“The 
parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President except [for] 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office . . . and we decide the case with that 
understanding.”). 
54. The vast majority of the civil service enjoys “for cause” job removal protections. M. 
Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1198 (2000) 
(“There exists an elaborate web of laws and regulations associated with the civil service system; those 
laws limit patronage and require for-cause removal of some employees.”). So do the heads of 
independent agencies. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 620. 
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protections against removal for reasons other than cause, and may challenge 
efforts to remove them by resorting to their very own protective agency, the 
Merit Services Protection Board.55 
The courts have thus adapted the removal power by permitting Congress 
to restrict it in many ways, but they also insist on some formal limits at the 
outer bounds.56 The legislature can go too far, by, for example, offering too 
many layers of for-cause protection between the President and important 
officials that he might want to replace57 or by placing its own members in the 
leadership of federal agencies.58 
These protections of presidential autonomy are exceedingly modest, but it 
is not clear that the modern President needs much protecting. We live in the era 
of the “imperial presidency,”59 a time of “presidential administration,” as 
Justice Elena Kagan has put it.60 The President may not have much control over 
who is appointed to, or removed from, the executive branch based on the way 
courts have interpreted the Appointments, Vesting, and Take Care Clauses. But 
that may not mean there is a reason to worry about it. 
B. Congress’s Legislative Role Has Been Formally but Not Functionally 
Protected 
In theory, the legislature should be the only organ of government able to 
make rules of general applicability and future effect. That is, after all, a 
definition of legislation, and legislative power has been allocated to Congress 
by Article I of the Constitution.61 But because our society is far too complicated 
for the 538 members of Congress to make all the rules, separation of powers 
jurisprudence has become a matter of policing some formal constitutional 
requirements without attempting to prevent the legislature from substantively 
giving plenty of its legislative powers away to agencies both inside and outside 
 
55. See Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps of 
Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, and Freytag, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2282 (2011) 
(discussing some of the limitations on removal of SES officials). For a discussion of the procedures 
required for taking adverse action against SES employees, see Senior Executive Service: Adverse 
Actions, U.S. OFFICE PERSONNEL MGMT. (2020), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-
executive-service/adverse-actions [https://perma.cc/G26L-CFNZ]. 
56. As Justice Elena Kagan has observed, “the courts sometimes have allowed Congress to 
insulate the administrative state from the President through limitations on his power to remove 
officeholders.” Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2271 (2001). 
57. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
58. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 
252 (1991). 
59. The term comes from Arthur Schlesinger. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
60. Kagan, supra note 56, at 2246. 
61. “Unlike other state action, legislation consists of rules having continuing force and 
intended to be observed and applied in the future.” John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 
277 U.S. 100, 104 (1928); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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of the executive branch. Perhaps the judiciary has the power to use its Article I 
weapons to strike down truly transformative exercises of lawmaking power by 
government bodies other than Congress. But it has not done so yet. 
The most famous of the separation of powers principles, the 
nondelegation doctrine, in theory prevents anyone else from usurping the 
legislature’s role as the creator of laws. It is derived from Article I, section 1 of 
the Constitution, which provides that “all legislative power” is vested in 
Congress.62 
But, as every law student learns in the first week of their administrative-
law class, the nondelegation doctrine allows Congress to delegate almost any 
legislative power it likes to almost any government institution.63 Under the 
doctrine, Congress must provide the delegate with an “intelligible principle” 
that cabins its discretion, ensuring that the legislature has done its job 
establishing the basics of a regulatory scheme.64 
But Congress can offer the vaguest guidance and still pass the intelligible 
principle test—it can direct agencies to regulate in the “public interest”65 or in a 
way “requisite to protect the public health.”66 The Supreme Court has turned 
away at least six nondelegation challenges away in the past two decades, and 
the votes were not close until 2019.67 
The only run of opinions related to the nondelegation doctrine with any 
bite have invoked the so-called “major questions” doctrine. That doctrine, 
though quite nebulous, would police agency decisionmaking on the basis of the 
importance of the matter to be decided As the D.C. Circuit has put it, “an 
agency can issue a major rule—i.e., one of great economic and political 
significance—only if it has clear congressional authorization to do so.”68 
Ambiguous authorizations by implication would not do. 
Although it is not clear, the Supreme Court might have undone an agency 
regulation on major-questions grounds when it rejected the FDA’s initial bid to 
 
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
63. “Courts should finally shake off the cobwebs of the old jurisprudence and acknowledge 
that the nondelegation doctrine, and its corollaries for statutory interpretation, are dead.” Eric A. Posner 
& Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1762 (2002). Some 
argue that the nondelegation doctrine has been dead for centuries. See, e.g., Jason Iuliano & Keith E. 
Whittington, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 431 (2017) (noting that 
by the New Deal era, “the nondelegation doctrine—the meaningful and judicially enforced 
constitutional constraint on legislatures—was already dead”). But see Ilan Wurman, As-Applied 
Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 975, 977 (2018) (attempting to fashion a workable revision to 
nondelegation). 
64. “Applying this ‘intelligible principle’ test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence 
has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate 
power under broad general directives.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
65. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943). 
66. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001). 
67. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 114 (6th ed. 2013). 
68. U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 855 F.3d 381, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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regulate cigarettes on the basis that nicotine was a drug and cigarettes a drug-
delivery device.69 The Court’s opinion suggested that, although nicotine surely 
is a drug, and cigarettes delivered those drugs to people, Congress would have 
to explicitly authorize an expansion of the agency’s jurisdiction to the tobacco 
industry because the FDA had never regulated the industry before and had in 
the past disclaimed any intention of doing so.70 The case could be understood, 
as the D.C. Circuit apparently understood it, as a nondelegation doctrine 
constraint requiring explicit delegations when the question is a really important 
one.71 
But if some day the major-questions doctrine, such that it is, is invoked on 
the basis of the separation of powers, there is an equally plausible way to read 
the doctrine as a “no funny business” rule rooted less in the separation of 
powers and more in judicial caution. When agencies regulate incrementally, 
courts generally defer; when they seek to dramatically expand their jurisdiction, 
courts grow less likely to do so.  
The nondelegation story, apart from the possible major-questions codicil, 
looks like the story of other clauses of the Constitution that might divide the 
legislative role from other governmental roles. The Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clauses, for example, limit congressional interference in the 
administrative state by requiring a particular set of actions for legislation.72 But 
one look at our current regulatory state establishes that these clauses have been 
interpreted formally, rather than functionally.73 If the President directs the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate emissions rules that 
transform the economy and the environment, has there essentially been 
legislation that failed to go through both houses of Congress and be presented 
to the president? Under such a regime, EPA rules furthering the presidential 
order would presumably be of “general applicability” and have “forward 
effect.”74 
So far, the answer has been no. Instead, the courts have limited the 
Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses to other sorts of violations; for 
 
69. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (“Contrary to its 
representations to Congress since 1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate an industry 
constituting a significant portion of the American economy.”). 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 642 (1990) (noting 
“the special conventions of the legislative process, such as the requirements that a bill must be passed in 
the same form by both chambers (bicameralism) and that it must then be presented to the President 
(presentment)”). 
73. There are scholars who think that the boundaries between formalism and functionalism are 
unstable, though in this piece I treat them as such. “The Court’s separation-of-powers case law can be 
understood as a form of cycling between rules and standards.” Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The 
Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 351 (2016). 
74. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2018) (defining agency rulemaking in a way that makes it look like 
legislation). 
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example, they have required statutory amendments to go through the 
constitutional procedure involving both houses of Congress and signature by 
the President.75 As we will see, these separation of powers doctrines have 
notched some actual victories for separation of powers enthusiasts, although if 
anything, results have reduced legislative and executive control over the 
administrative state, rather than enhancing it. 
C. Protecting the Judicial Power in a Government of Adjudicators 
Although Article III vests the judicial power in the courts, it has not been 
interpreted to prevent agencies from making adjudications and has often been 
used to make it difficult for those aggrieved by adjudications (or rulemaking for 
that matter) to obtain judicial review or get nationwide relief through that 
review. It has, to be sure, pared back the powers of administrative courts that 
look too much like actual courts, but that is the limit of the way this doctrine 
has checked administrators. 
The administrative state makes backward-looking determinations of 
liability paired with some sort of penalty all the time, just as courts do.76 Is that 
consistent with the separation of powers? The Supreme Court has said it was 
since Crowell v. Benson, a dispute between two private parties over the 
compensation due to an injured harbor worker under the Longshoremen and 
Harbor Worker Compensation Act, and one presided over by the deputy 
commissioner of the U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission.77 The Court 
permitted administrative adjudications of publicly created, as opposed to 
common-law, rights.78 As the Court later put it in Stern v. Marshall, if a “right 
is integrally related to particular federal government action,” then it generally 
may be allocated to agency adjudication.79 The Court reaffirmed this principle 
by a 7-2 vote in 2018 in Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, 
LLC.80 
As John Harrison has put it, Crowell meant that “administrative 
adjudication of issues arising under federal statutes was approved.”81 Since 
statutes cover vast areas of our modern economy, agency adjudicators have a 
free hand to make decisions in all sorts of economic areas, ranging from the 
assessment of copyright royalties, to the right to unionize, to the materiality of 
the disclosures in corporate earnings statements. To be sure, these decisions are 
 
75. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) 
76. See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 
1118 (1984). 
77. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54-63 (1932). 
78. See id. 
79. 546 U.S. 462, 490-91 (2011). 
80. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
81. John Harrison, The Relation Between Limitations on and Requirements of Article III 
Adjudication, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1367, 1379 (2007). 
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subject to judicial review, and in that very important sense, the judiciary does 
check the administrative state. However it does not do so by placing all cases 
and controversies as matters for federal judges alone to decide—a separation of 
powers remedy—but rather by letting courts review adjudications conducted at 
the agency level. 
If anything, when a court cites Article III, the opinion is likely to be good 
news for the agency. For example, when the D.C. Circuit invokes the 
separation of powers in relation to Article III, it often is dismissing a claim 
against a regulator for a lack of standing by the plaintiff. It did so in four of its 
standing cases in the last two decades.82 A vigorous standing doctrine protects 
the administrative state by dismissing lawsuits seeking to constrain it on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs who brought the suit have not been injured by 
agency action in a concrete and particularized way. The canonical standing suit, 
the one that created the modern standing test, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
threw out efforts by environmental groups to obligate the Secretaries of the 
Interior and Commerce to apply a part of the Endangered Species Act to 
projects located overseas but funded by the United States on this basis.83 
It is nonetheless worth noting for the sake of completeness that there is 
one part of the semi-administrative adjudicatory state that has been curtailed by 
Article III: bankruptcy courts.84 And one important modern issue on which, if 
anything, the separation of powers component of Article III is likely to be 
interpreted in an agency-friendly way very soon: nationwide injunctions. 
Bankruptcy courts look and work more like courts than they do agencies, 
but they are staffed with Article I appointees, rather than Article III judges. The 
Supreme Court has a long tradition of resisting the allocation of common-law 
claims to bankruptcy proceedings, and more generally, of resisting the 
allocation of all of the powers of Article III to Article I judges.85 In 2011, the 
Supreme Court invoked the separation of powers to prevent bankruptcy courts 
from hearing state counterclaims.86 In 2015, it qualified this holding to permit 
bankruptcy courts to hear such claims with the parties’ consent.87 This all 
began in 1982, when the Court threw out a bankruptcy-process-reform statute 
on the grounds that it gave bankruptcy judges too much judicial power, a rare 
 
82. See infra Table 2. 
83. As the Court explained, “causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of 
the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
84. For a discussion and a critique, see Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III 
Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1162 (2015). 
85. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 (1982) 
(striking down a statute seeking to give bankruptcy courts “all of the ‘powers of a court of equity, law, 
and admiralty’”). 
86. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
87. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015). 
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case in which the separation of powers seriously impacted a legislative 
scheme.88 
New and pressing Article III separation of powers claims are likely to 
concern the propriety of the nationwide injunction, but, like standing, limiting 
nationwide injunctions on separation of powers grounds preserves, rather than 
limits, bureaucratic discretion.89 
A nationwide injunction works exactly how it sounds—it affords relief not 
only to the particular plaintiff who brought the suit (that would mean that she 
would get the injunction against a government policy being applied to her) but 
to everyone in the country.90 Nationwide injunctions have recently been 
deployed against signature administrative initiatives, regardless of the political 
party that supports the initiative. A nationwide injunction was adopted when a 
judge in Seattle barred enforcement of the one of the Trump administration’s 
travel bans,91 and another when a judge in Texas threw out a plan to defer 
deportations of illegal immigrant families whose children had grown up in the 
United States—a signature immigration achievement of the Obama 
administration.92 
These injunctions have not just restricted regulators, they have also posed 
problems for the Supreme Court, which has been forced to weigh in on various 
nationwide injunctions soon after they have been implemented.93 As Nicolas 
Bagley and Samuel Bray recently put it, “Instead of allowing many judges to 
reach independent judgments,” nationwide injunctions “resolve the question for 
all courts. The government has little choice but to appeal, sometimes all the 
way up to the Supreme Court.”94 
 
88. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 55. 
89. The argument is one of standing, but also one of judicial modesty. Compare Samuel L. 
Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420 (2017) 
(“No matter how important the question and no matter how important the value of uniformity, a federal 
court should not award a national injunction.”), with Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide 
Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018) (“[I]n some cases, nationwide injunctions are also the 
only means to provide plaintiffs with complete relief and avoid harm to thousands of individuals 
similarly situated to the plaintiffs.”). 
90. For a discussion, see Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 
2098 (2017). 
91. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 
2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 3774041 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017) (“This TRO is 
granted on a nationwide basis and prohibits enforcement of Sections 3(c), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), and 5(e) of the 
Executive Order (as described in the above paragraph) at all United States borders and ports of entry 
pending further orders from this court.”). 
92. For a discussion of the immigration litigation, see Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 
188 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam mem. by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
93. See, e.g., Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (reversing an injunction against 
border-wall funding); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018) (reversing an injunction against 
another version of the travel ban). 
94. Nicolas Bagley & Samuel Bray, Judges Shouldn’t Have the Power to Halt Laws 
Nationwide, ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-
nationwide-injunctions/574471 [https://perma.cc/B3PE-MKYK]. 
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It is certainly the case that injunctions have posed separation of powers 
problems before, but these concerns have been different from those posed by a 
nationwide injunction. In the past, academics worried that structural injunctions 
issued against state-run institutions for violations of federal constitutional law 
put judges in a quasi-legislative and quasi-executive role.95 These concerns 
arise where, for instance, an injunction gives courts control over school districts 
and prisons to remedy equal-protection and due-process violations. In such 
instances, judges are involved in the promulgation of new standards, in 
funding, and in the oversight of state-level public institutions. Is this consistent 
with separation of powers limitations on the judicial role? Abram Chayes 
thought it was.96 Others thought otherwise.97 
Institutional-reform litigation is still important, but vastly diminished from 
the school- and prison-reform era.98 The nationwide injunction is more about 
thwarting broad federal regulatory initiatives at the trial-court level, rather than 
about judicial takeover of a local institution. 
Still, like institutional-reform litigation, if the nationwide injunction 
becomes viewed as a threat to good administration because it grants relief to 
persons who are not parties to a case, its threat to the administrative state is not 
likely to last long.99 Attorney General William Barr has opined that 
“nationwide injunctions violate the Separation of Powers” because of this 
standing concern and because they “allow district courts to wield 
unprecedented power.”100 In 2018, the House Judiciary Committee voted on a 
bipartisan basis to advance a bill that would ban nationwide injunctions.101 If 
such a law passed, it would be extremely surprising if the courts struck it down 
as an impermissible interference with the judicial power. 
 
95. For an overview and elegy of this era, see David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through 
Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1018 (2004) 
(“Institutional reform cases are paradigmatic exercises of judicial power in the public sphere and have 
been for the last half-century.”). 
96. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1289 (1976). 
97. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE (1991). 
98. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable 
Remedies, 30 STAN L. REV. 661, 664 (1978) (positing that the separation of powers required federal 
courts to act cautiously when it came to institutional reform remedies against state actors); John C. Yoo, 
Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1122-24 (1996) (claiming that elaborate judicial remedies threatened the structure 
of the separation of powers). 
99. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996). 
100. William P. Barr, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the American Law Institute on Nationwide 
Injunctions (May 21, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-
delivers-remarks-american-law-institute-nationwide [https://perma.cc/X45Y-NP2H]. 
101. House Panel Advances Bill to Bar Nationwide Injunctions, LAW360 (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1082785/house-panel-advances-bill-to-bar-nationwide-injunctions 
[https://perma.cc/2R4Y-LM7X]. 
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D. The Doctrinal Limits of Separation of Powers Remedies 
The separation of powers doctrines discussed in this Part are raised in the 
context of the coordination of the several branches of government, and the 
place of the modern administrative state within and outside of those branches. 
Why, doctrinally, aren’t meritorious claims vindicated with serious remedies? 
The answers lie in the development of two mostly practical constraints on 
the remedies that courts can order for violations of the separation of powers—
the de facto officer doctrine and the preference for severability. The doctrines 
are not just rules of judicial efficiency; in theory, they arise out of vague 
separation of powers concerns about overweening courts. 
Of the two, the de facto officer doctrine is the stranger. When deployed, it 
serves to nullify, at the remedy stage, those rare cases where separation of 
powers claims succeed on the merits.102 As the Supreme Court has explained, 
the “de facto officer doctrine confers validity upon acts performed by a person 
acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the 
legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is deficient.”103 
The doctrine is deployed against plaintiffs who successfully argued for the 
unconstitutionality of a government action.104 The concern is that without it, 
there would be chaotic, multiple, and repetitious suits challenging every action 
taken by every official whose claim to office could be open to question.105 It is 
a doctrine rooted almost purely in efficiency, stability and settled expectations, 
and some concern that the alternatives would give judges too much power over 
the process of unwinding (un)official acts. 
In Ryder v. United States, the Supreme Court appeared to limit the 
doctrine, at least in criminal contexts.106 In ordering a new trial for a defendant 
whose conviction had been affirmed by an unconstitutionally appointed 
 
102. The Supreme Court seemed to find that the doctrine should not apply to constitutional 
challenges, though it is hard to square that decision with the decision to uphold a sanction issued by an 
unconstitutionally appointed agency in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010). For a 
discussion of the de facto officer doctrine, see SW General, Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 67, 81 (D.C. Cir. 
2015), aff’d on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) (holding that an act by an invalidly appointed 
official is accorded de facto validity unless plaintiff raises challenge “at or around the time that the 
challenged government action [was] taken” (citing Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 
1984))). 
103. Norton v. Shelby Cty., 118 U.S. 425, 440 (1886). 
104. See, e.g., Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 550-51 (1972) (holding that legislative acts 
performed by legislators elected under an unconstitutional apportionment scheme were not void). For a 
more controversial example, see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (affirming sanctions handed 
down by an unconstitutionally appointed board after the Court remedied the board’s unconstitutionality 
by severing the problematic removal protections). 
105. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180-81 (1995). 
106. See id. For more on this distinction, see Deepak Gutpa, The Consumer Protection Bureau 
and the De Facto Officer Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 945 (2013) (“There is a significant difference 
between situations in which the government is engaged in an ongoing action against a particular 
person . . . and situations in which the government is establishing laws and regulations of general 
applicability, carrying out investigation, or engaging in general supervision of an industry.”). 
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military appeals board, the Court decided that a defendant who “makes a timely 
challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who 
adjudicates his case is entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and 
whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation indeed occurred.”107 But, as 
we will see, Ryder has been ignored by lower courts in civil contexts. 
Severability rules are easier to understand. They are designed to minimize 
the fallout from a separation of powers problem. The test for severability is, 
“unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those 
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the 
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.”108 Rather 
than throw out an entire statute, a court is supposed to examine whether: first, 
the rest of the statute can stand on its own if an unconstitutional part of it is 
voided, and second, whether the legislature would have wanted it to remain 
standing. Moreover, courts have placed the thumb on the scale in favor of 
severability. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “in separation of powers cases, 
severance of the unconstitutional provision is the chosen remedy.”109 
Severability is based on judicial modesty, and its practice reflects a 
judicial duty to “try to limit the solution to the problem.”110 In practice, 
however, severability is used more expansively than this. Courts will modestly 
rewrite statutes under its guise. For example, if an agency has an Appointments 
Clause problem, a court may choose not to eliminate the offending appointment 
but instead to rewrite the statute to provide for an appropriate substitute 
process.111 
The critiques of these remedial limitations are easy to imagine. As Kirstin 
Hickman has observed, plaintiffs unlikely to obtain a remedy are less like to 
sue, even if they have meritorious claims.112 On these grounds, Kent Barnett 
has encouraged Congress to provide fallback remedies and to incentivize 
litigants to pursue separation of powers cases with the potential award of 
scheduled damages and attorneys’ fees.113 
 
107. See id. 
108. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). For a discussion of severability, 
see Brian Charles Lea, Situational Severability, 103 VA. L. REV. 735, 737 (2017). 
109. John Doe Co. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 849 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
110. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006). In other words, 
“a court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.” Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 
U.S. 641, 652 (1984). 
111. See, e.g., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 115 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (adding a removal-at-will clause to a statute governing an administrative tribunal 
organized to set royalty rates). 
112. Kristin E. Hickman, Symbolism and Separation of Powers in Agency Design, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1475, 1476 (2018). 
113. Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil - Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation 
of Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 483 (2014) (“[P]revailing regulated parties often obtain not 
only an unsatisfactory judicial remedy, but one that may place them in an even worse position than the 
one they occupied before bringing suit.”). 
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II. The Denial of Remedies When Separation of Powers Rights Are Found 
In almost every separation of powers case in the past two decades, when 
the Supreme Court or D.C. Circuit have recognized a right, they have not 
afforded the plaintiff a remedy, or at least not much of one. A tour through the 
remedies ordered by the courts in separation of powers cases suggests why. 
Eliminating entire agencies or channels for policymaking because of a technical 
structural problem looks like overreaction; the plaintiff’s complaint about an 
organizational-chart problem in the agency that is persecuting her often loses 
luster when compared to the substance of her conduct. 
It is still surprising when the remedies are crafted so narrowly that 
absolutely nothing changes, as was the case when the Federal Election 
Commission was found to be unconstitutionally structured but allowed to 
continue to operate in 1976.114 Sometimes, the plaintiffs themselves do not 
obtain any relief even when they win the case on the merits, as was the case 
when the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board was found to be 
unconstitutionally structured in 2010.115 
The lack of remedies calls for some realism about the separation of 
powers. This part of the paper will review those remedies in detail; Part IV will 
offer that realism. 
A. The Long List of Modest Remedies 
In those rare cases where courts decide to reward a separation of powers 
claimant with a decision on the merits, they award no relief to the plaintiff. This 





1. Appointments Clause Sidesteps 
Consider the recent semisuccessful campaign to take on the hoary APA 
policymaking procedure known as formal adjudication, under which agencies 
enforce their regulations through trial type proceedings overseen by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).116 The Supreme Court in Lucia v. SEC 
agreed that the ALJ’s role in formal adjudication did not pass constitutional 
muster because the ALJs were “inferior officers” who had been appointed not 
by a head of a department, as required by the Appointments Clause, but 
 
114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
115. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
116. The process is set forth in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2018). 
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through a competitive process administered by the Office of Personnel 
Management.117 
However, the Court observed, “the appropriate remedy for an adjudication 
tainted with an appointments violation is a new hearing,” which looks like the 
sort of remand to the agency that might be offered in a nonconstitutional 
case.118 Once the SEC issued an order ratifying the appointment of ALJs, it 
concluded that “[t]o cure the constitutional error, another [ALJ] (or the 
Commission itself) must hold [a] new hearing” over the defendant, now that the 
appointment process—where the SEC Commissioners, operating as a head of a 
department, signed off on the appointment—passed constitutional muster.119 
In other words, even though the plaintiff established that the agency 
process finding that he had committed securities fraud was unconstitutional, the 
plaintiff did not win dismissal of the charges against him. If that does not 
exactly elevate constitutional litigation over the ordinary practice in ordinary 
administrative law, it is worth noting that Lucia’s remand would be made in the 
context of judicial review that did not quibble at all with the substance or 
procedures of the agency’s decision—the only problem lay in the place of the 
decisionmaker on the agency’s organizational chart. It is, if anything, 
particularly likely that agency decisionmakers will reach the same decision they 
reached last time, because the courts identified no error in the decision itself, 
just error in the way the decider was picked for the job. 
In other cases about ALJ appointments, the courts have fallen over 
themselves to affirm that, despite the constitutional problem of competitive 
selection through an OPM administered civil-service process, nothing had to 
change. One judge emphasized that even if formal adjudication violated the 
Appointments Clause, an easy fix “portends no change to any” ALJ’s “robust 
protections” and independence.120 
The ALJ-case remedies exemplify how the Appointments Clause never 
seems to count in cases where it is not honored. In Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the Federal Election Commission was 
unconstitutionally structured—its Commissioners were appointed in part by 
members of Congress, in ways that did not track the language of the 
Appointments Clause at all.121 Nonetheless, the Court allowed the Commission 
to continue to regulate elections and to bring enforcement actions, even after 
finding it to be illegally constructed.122 Nor did it disturb the validity of the past 
actions of the FEC.123 The reason was the de facto officer doctrine. As the 
 
117. 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1190 (10th Cir. 2016). 
121. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976).  
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
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Court said, “the Commission’s inability to exercise certain powers because of 
the method by which its members have been selected should not affect the 
validity of the Commission’s administrative actions and determinations to this 
date.”124 
Buckley, though it kept an unconstitutionally organized agency in place 
for months, is not a remedial outlier. When the D.C. Circuit held that members 
of Congress could not serve on an agency designed to regulate the capital’s 
airports, it reached a similar remedial conclusion. The court decided to “direct . 
. . that actions taken by the Board to this date not be invalidated automatically 
on the basis of our decision” because of the de facto officer doctrine. 125 
The courts have done this sort of thing before in other separation of 
powers contexts. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning, Inc., concluded 
that the National Labor Relations Board had relied on some illegal 
appointments to do its business but let the agency quickly reach almost the 
same conclusions when redeciding the cases originally before the illegal 
appointees.126 Peter Shane concluded that the separation of powers triumph 
would almost certainly not “change the outcome of the [regulated party’s] 
case”127—even though the D.C. Circuit thought that the issues raised in the case 
went “to the very power of the Board to act and implicate fundamental 
separation of powers concerns.”128 
Other successful Appointments Clause cases have worked in the same 
way. In Intercollegiate Broadcasting System v. Copyright Royalty Board, the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that the three judges on the Copyright Royalty Board, 
who made determinations of reasonable rates for royalty payments where the 
parties were unable to agree to such terms, enjoyed unconstitutional protections 
against removal.129 Under the statute that created the board, the judges on it 
could be removed by the Librarian of Congress, a presidential appointee 
confirmed by the Senate only for misconduct or neglect of duty.130 Given the 
authority they wielded, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the copyright-royalty 
judges were “principal officers”; thus, as the court explained, the structure of 
the Board violates the Appointments Clause.131 
 
124. Id. 
125. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 917 
F.2d 48, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff’d, 501 U.S. 252 (1991). 
126. N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014) 
127. Peter Shane, Two Cheers for Recess Appointments, REG. REV. (June 26, 2014), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2014/06/26/26-shane-two-cheers-recess-appointments 
[https://perma.cc/JN6F-PYW4]. 
128. Noel Canning v. N.L.R.B., 705 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 573 U.S. 513, 134 
S. Ct. 2550, 189 L. Ed. 2d 538 (2014). 
129. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 115 (2015). 
130. 17 U.S.C. § 802(i) (2018). 
131. Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, 796 F.3d at 115. 
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But rather than invalidate the Board, the court concluded that 
“invalidating and severing the restrictions on the librarian’s ability to remove 
the CRJs eliminates the Appointments Clause violation and minimizes any 
collateral damage.”132 This time the plaintiff was afforded some, albeit limited, 
relief. The D.C. Circuit vacated the ’Board’s decision and remanded to the 
board for reconsideration, after which the Board conducted a paper proceeding 
and reaffirmed the royalty rate it had originally charged the plaintiffs.133 
The Federal Circuit offered the same sort of remedial gruel to plaintiffs 
who argued that adjudicators on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board were 
unconstitutionally appointed. The court agreed but easily resolved the 
constitutional problem by “severing the restriction on removal of 
[Administrative Patent Judges] renders them inferior rather than principal 
officers”134 As with Lucia, the remedy for the originally unconstitutional trial 
was a new trial before a different panel of administrative judges, now made 
removable in theory—though likely not in practice—by their supervisors.135 
Once again, the constitutional victory by the plaintiff resulted in their being 
little better off as a matter of regulation, and only worse off as a matter of legal 
fees. 
2. Removal Workarounds 
“Successful” removal-powers claims have fared as poorly, as exemplified 
by the way that the Supreme Court has addressed restrictions on removal. Free 
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB arose out of disciplinary proceedings brought 
against an accounting firm by the Public Control Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB).136 The Board was an institution overseen by SEC Commissioners; it 
was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to police standards in the accounting 
profession.137 It was meant to ensure that accounting firms were subject to high 
professional and ethical standards; its budget came largely from fees paid by 
the accounting industry, and Board members, critically, enjoyed for-cause 
protection, as did the SEC Commissioners who appointed them.138 
The Supreme Court held that “multilevel protection from removal is 
contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President,” and 




134. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
135. Nor would the plaintiffs even necessarily receive a new hearing for their troubles: “We 
see no error in the new panel proceeding on the existing written record but leave to the Board’s sound 
discretion whether it should allow additional briefing or reopen the record in any individual case.” Id. at 
1340. 
136. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493 (2010). 
137. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7220 (2018). 
138. Id. 
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unconstitutionally structured when it disciplined the plaintiff, an accounting 
firm.139 
The problem was rooted in the President’s removal powers.140 “The 
President . . . must have some power of removing those for whom he cannot 
continue to be responsible,” the Court explained, and the PCAOB structure did 
not give him enough of it.141 
But even if the case was a win for plaintiffs on the merits, the Court’s 
severability analysis resulted in little remedial vindication. The Court reasoned 
that it was not “the existence of the Board” that “violate[s] the separation of 
powers,” but the particular removal restrictions in the statute.142 “When 
confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, [courts] try to limit the solution to 
the problem”; therefore, the appropriate remedy was to remove the problematic 
provisions so that they would not constrain the President’s powers going 
forward.143 The SEC issued a statement after the decision expressing its 
pleasure that the Court did “not call into question any action taken by the 
PCAOB since its inception.”144 The accounting firm, despite winning the case, 
remained disciplined by the PCAOB. 
The Court is not alone—those lower-court Appointments Clause cases 
that essentially affirmed the adjudications of administrative agencies while 
making their adjudicators putatively easier to remove by the President also 
suggest that the President’s removal power is no awesome thing.145 They 
suggest that the theoretical creation of such a power just about blesses decisions 
already made by the adjudicators before that removal power existed—cold 
comfort for the plaintiffs who brought the cases. 
3. Bicameralism and Presentment 
Bicameralism and Presentment cases have, on occasion, also been much 
ado about nothing. In Bowsher v. Synar,146 a case about one variant of a 
balanced-budget act passed by Congress, the Court’s decision to throw out 
balanced-budget mandates has been ignored by the legislature eager to govern 
itself by them. 
 
139. 561 U.S. at 484. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 493. 
142. Id. at 508-09. 
143. Id. at 508; see also John Doe Co. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 849 F.3d 1129, 1133 
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (stating that “traditional constraints on separation of powers remedies” refuted the 
plaintiffs’ position that a removal-restrictions claim could invalidate a CFPB action against them). 
144. Press Release, SEC, Statement on the Supreme Court’s Decision in FEF v. PCAOB (June 
28, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-111.htm [https://perma.cc/P7RP-FKXH]. 
145. See supra Section II.A.1. 
146. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
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In Bowsher, the Supreme Court held that a method devised by Congress to 
constrain spending was unconstitutional because it gave executive power to a 
congressionally controlled official, the Comptroller General. The Comptroller 
was appointed by the President but removable only by a joint resolution by 
Congress, which raised, for the Court, the “dangers of congressional usurpation 
of Executive Branch functions.”147 
Under the Gramm Redman Hollings Act, “If in any fiscal year the federal 
budget deficit exceeds the maximum deficit amount by more than a specified 
sum, the Act requires across-the-board cuts in federal spending to reach the 
targeted deficit level, with half of the cuts made to defense programs and the 
other half made to nondefense programs.”148 
The problem with the statute was the role the Comptroller General played 
in applying this formula, “through a rather complicated procedure.”149 The 
Comptroller had the power to make across-the-board cuts to the proposed 
budget if certain targets were not met.150 Once made, the revised budget would 
be presented to the President who was then obligated to issue an order 
implementing the budgetary changes unless Congress acted to undo them.151 
The Supreme Court concluded that this mechanism essentially gave the 
Comptroller executive power that the President alone could wield. As the Court 
held, “To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws would 
be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. . . . This kind of congressional 
control over the execution of the laws. . . is constitutionally impermissible.”152 
Bowsher did not take the possibility of a balanced-budget statute off the 
constitutional table for all time—indeed, less effective balanced-budget 
legislation has been passed two times since.153 However, Bowsher limited 
Congress’s role in implementing the cuts that would be required by a future 
budget-balancing regime, which has in turn limited congressional enthusiasm 
for automatic legislation. The Court recognized congressional incentives when 
it chose to strike the budget-balancing mechanism in the statute, rather than 
severing the provision of the Act providing that the Comptroller General could 
be removed only by a joint resolution of Congress. “Striking the removal 
provisions would lead to a statute that Congress would probably have refused 
to adopt,” the Court reasoned, because it would give executive-branch officials 
 
147. Id. at 727. 
148. Id. The overruled Act can be found at Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985). 
149. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727. 
150. See id. 
151. See id. 
152. Id. at 726-27. 
153. Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act 
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987), shortly after Bowsher was decided, and, in 1990, 
passed the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990), which expired in 
2002. 
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(including the now-immunized-from-congressional-control Comptroller) too 
much power to specify the cuts required to bring the budget into balance.154 
While Bowsher eliminated one mechanism to reach balanced budgeting, it 
is possible to read too much into the relief the Supreme Court ordered in the 
case. Congress, concerned about the risks of judicial review, created a fallback 
mechanism to try to get to a balanced budget that essentially required fast-track 
approval of a balanced budget by the legislature.155 The Court’s decision 
“simply permit[ted] the fallback provisions to come into play.”156 
4. Functional Separation of Powers Claims 
In addition to the above, there are some more amorphous separation of 
powers claims. These claims might be understood as a “this is just a bit too 
much” rule of constitutional law. But these claims, even if they worked in 1935 
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,157 are unlikely to result in a 
useful remedy today. For example, efforts to take on the CFPB are not likely to 
result in the demise of the agency, but rather, at best, in a ruling making its 
head removable by the President. The claims made against the CFPB point to a 
novel separation of powers theory: the agency, run by a single head, with a 
guaranteed budget that Congress cannot reduce, is simply too insulated from 
control by executive- or legislative-branch elected officials to exist.158 But 
rather than being an existential threat, proponents of this theory of the case 
suggest that nothing really need change. Then-Judge Kavanaugh posited that 
the CFPB’s illegal independence could be fixed with a “targeted remedy [that] 
will not affect the ongoing operations” of the agency.159 The outcome was that 
“the CFPB as remedied will continue operating” as it had in the past.160 
 
154. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 735. 
155. See 2 U.S.C. § 274(f) (2018). 
156. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736. 
157. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
158. As the D.C. Circuit explained, “The CFPB’s concentration of enormous executive power 
in a single, unaccountable, unchecked Director not only departs from settled historical practice, but also 
poses a far greater risk of arbitrary decisionmaking and abuse of power, and a far greater threat to 
individual liberty, than does a multi-member independent agency.” PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (2016). 
159. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). A district court who agreed that the CFPB was 
unconstitutionally structured also let the case against the defendant proceed because state regulators 
were involved. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 785 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
160. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 9. To be sure, Judge Henderson in that case crafted a dissent that 
would have struck the entire part of Dodd-Frank that created the CFPB, so some judges will at least 
entertain sweeping relief (even if only in relatively inconsequential dissenting opinions). See id. at 56-
60. 
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5. What Is a Plaintiff to Do? 
None of these outcomes come close to giving plaintiffs the relief that they 
sought. After the SEC reopened its case against him, Raymond Lucia sued in 
district court, seeking an order “[e]njoining the SEC from carrying out an 
administrative proceeding against Mr. Lucia . . . or any other administrative 
proceedings.”161 One of his lawyers protested, “There is a human toll that is 
rarely considered in cases like this. . . . Haling a citizen before an unlawful 
[administrative process] is a grave breach of his constitutional rights.”162 The 
administrative case against Lucia remains ongoing as of this writing. 
Other separation of powers plaintiffs have sought the same thing— 
dismissal, ideally with prejudice, of the enforcement action against them. The 
mortgage lender PHH, when faced with a nine-figure civil monetary penalty 
from the CFPB, asked that the order be vacated, or set aside, given 
“unprecedented agency action that ignores fundamental constitutional 
principles.”163 But even if PHH had won the case, then-Judge Kavanaugh, who 
was sympathetic to its predicament, wrote that the appropriate remedy would 
allow the CFPB to “continue to operate and to perform its many duties.”164 The 
accounting firm sanctioned by the PCAOB sought “an order and judgment 
enjoining the Board and its Members from taking any further action against 
Plaintiff Beckstead and Watts and nullifying and voiding any prior adverse 
action against Beckstead and Watts.”165 It instead received precisely the same 
sanction it faced before it “won.” In Ryder, the Court spoke about the 
importance of separation of powers claims and the need to incentivize litigants, 
yet it still only remanded the case, which the plaintiff won, back to the military 
tribunals for a redo—the best that plaintiffs can hope for, apparently, and a 
remedy that they often do not get.166 
An Appointments Clause case pending before the Supreme Court is 
replete with the same sort of hopeful prayers for relief. Aurelius, a hedge fund 
that purchased Puerto Rican sovereign debt at a discount, has filed suit against 
the board created by Congress to take the island through a bankruptcy process. 
It asks “that the debt adjustment case filed for the Commonwealth of Puerto . . . 
be dismissed as unauthorized,” and that further bankruptcy efforts “be 
 
161. Complaint at 23, Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. v. SEC, 2019 WL 3997332 (S.D. 
Cal. 2019) (No. 18-cv-2692). 
162. Press Release, New Civil Liberties Alliance, Lucia v. SEC: NCLA Files Suit Over 
Unconstitutional SEC Appointees (Nov. 29, 2018), https://nclalegal.org/2018/11/ncla-files-suit-over-
unconstitutional-sec-appointees [https://perma.cc/66BD-JAPB]. 
163. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at app. 61. 
164. Id. at 8. 
165. Complaint, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 2007 WL 891675 
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-0217). 
166. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180-81 (1995). 
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enjoined.”167 Based on past practice, if it wins the case, it should assume that it 
is unlikely to obtain the relief it seeks. 
6. The Spread of No-Remedy Constitutional Rights from the Separation of 
Powers 
Many worry that the First Amendment is being weaponized against the 
administrative state, and in some ways they are right to worry.168 I reviewed the 
Supreme Court database first assembled by Melvin Spaeth and currently 
updated at Washington University for all the recent cases where the Court had 
found an act of Congress to be unconstitutional, though, of course, not all of 
these cases were challenges to legislatively created administrative bodies.169 By 
far the most successful recent doctrinal area were First Amendment cases, 
which accounted for 16 of the 36, or 44% of the cases in which the Court found 
a statute to be unconstitutional.170 
But courts have been cautious in providing remedies in First Amendment 
cases as well—at least, when it comes to nonelection regulators. An example 
will suffice. The D.C. Circuit found that a program requiring companies to 
certify that they were not using certain conflict minerals to make their goods 
violated the First Amendment, but only if the government insisted that the 
firms use the words “DRC [for Democratic Republic of Congo] conflict free” 
in their disclosures.171 The remedy meant that the program in all other 
 
167. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 318 F. Supp. 3d 537, 541 (2018), aff’d in part 
sub nom Aurelius Investment, LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838 (2019), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2736 
(2019). 
168. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, 
and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (2015) (arguing that businesses are becoming the chief 
beneficiaries of the First Amendment protections for the freedom of speech). 
169. Harold J. Spaeth et al., The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U.L. (Sept. 13, 2019), 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org [https://perma.cc/W5U7-4TQS]. 
170. The First Amendment cases were Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (bar on 
registering obscene trademarks); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (aggregate campaign-
contribution limits); Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013) 
(endorsing antiprostitution campaign as a condition for receiving aid); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. 
Ct. 2537 (2012) (punishing false claims of veterans status); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (exempting religious bodies from Americans with 
Disability Act compliance); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (criminalizing animal-cruelty 
depictions); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (campaign-contribution limits for 
corporations); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (campaign-expenditure thresholds); FEC v. Wis. Right 
To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2006) (corporate political speech); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2004) 
(campaign contributions by minors); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2003) (pharmacy 
advertising restrictions); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (virtual child-pornography 
prohibition); USDA v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (compelled advertising in agricultural 
marketing scheme); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (advocacy prohibition as a 
funding condition); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (“signal bleed” 
prohibition for cable channels showing adult content); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (prohibition on casino advertising). 
171. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Commission’s 
final rule, violate[s] the First Amendment to the extent the statute and rule require regulated entities to 
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respects—certification, annual disclosures, and so on—could continue in the 
way that Congress had wished when it insisted that the SEC set it up in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act.172 It was only the requirement that 
particular words be used that constituted compelled speech; that label, the D.C. 
Circuit worried, “requires an issuer to tell consumers that its products are 
ethically tainted, even if they only indirectly finance armed groups.”173 
It is hard to seriously discipline the administrative state through any 
constitutional remedy, as we have seen. It could be that separation of powers 
remedial weakness will spread from separation of powers cases to other 
doctrinal areas theoretically revived by new appointees to the Supreme Court. 
B. The Exceptions That Support the Rule 
The courts occasionally do impose real remedies on government 
institutions on the basis of novel separation of powers claims. There are some 
cases where the remedies have been breathtaking—but very few. The one-
house-legislative-veto mechanism was included in dozens of statutes before 
Chadha struck it down as inconsistent with the Bicameralism and Presentment 
Clauses.174 The Supreme Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery 
Act of 1933 in United States v. Schechter Poultry in 1935,175 the nondelegation 
doctrine’s “one good year.”176 In United States v. Booker, the Court held that 
the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
were advisory, rather than mandatory, partly out of a sense that congressional 
delegation of sentencing parameters to an agency would interfere with the 
judicial role.177 
But the sentencing guidelines and the legislative veto had relatively short 
tenures, and were the subject of active opposition by duly appointed officers of 
the United States, such as Article III judges, in the case of the former,178 and 
 
report to the Commission and to state on their website that any of their products have ‘not been found to 
be ‘DRC conflict free.’”). 
172. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2218 (2010). 
173. National Association of Manufacturers, 800 F.3d at 530. 
174. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
175. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
176. Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 330 
(1999). 
177. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prevents judges from imposing 
criminal sentences above statutorily fixed maximums if the sentence is based on factors other than those 
determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt). 
178. See David Margolick, Chorus of Judicial Critics Assail Sentencing Guides, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 12, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/12/us/justice-numbers-special-report-full-spectrum-
judicial-critics-assail-prison.html [https://perma.cc/N64K-9675]. Justice Kennedy told Congress that he 
agreed “with most judges in the Federal system that mandatory minimums are an imprudent, unwise and 
often unjust mechanism for sentencing.” Mandatory Sentencing Is Criticized by Justice, N.Y. TIMES, 
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the Department of Justice in the case of the latter.179 Congress has famously 
ignored the decision in Chadha, passing multiple legislative vetoes since then, 
suggesting that when the Court goes big, it risks being ignored.180 And 
Schechter has proved to be a sui generis case in which Congress delegated a 
truly breathtaking amount of authority to regulate the national economy to the 
President and industry groups. No other comparable delegation has been 
attempted in peacetime.181 
For more sweeping modern-era separation of powers relief, one must turn 
to Clinton v. City of New York, which ended the possibility that Congress could 
give the President a “line item veto,” over any spending provision in the 
budget, a power that many state governors enjoy.182 The Line Item Veto Act 
gave the President the power to “cancel in whole” three types of provisions in a 
passed budget: “(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) 
any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.”183 In Clinton, 
the Supreme Court rejected the statute for formalist reasons: the affected 
constitutional clauses were the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses. As the 
Court explained, “If the Line Item Veto Act were valid, it would authorize the 
President to create a different law—one whose text was not voted on by either 
House of Congress or presented to the President for signature,”184 which the 
Court viewed as “surely not a document that may ‘become a law’ pursuant to 
the procedures designed by the Framers of Article I, §7, of the Constitution.”185 
The line-item veto is certainly a case where the Court actually provided 
the plaintiffs with a separation of powers remedy. But it is worth reflecting on 
the effect of the remedy. It rejected creative new mechanisms that the 
 
(Mar. 10, 1994) https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/10/us/mandatory-sentencing-is-criticized-by-
justice.html [https://perma.cc/4TX4-2CE4] (quoting testimony of Justice Kennedy). Judge Jack B. 
Weinstein, for example, announced he would not hear narcotics cases as a result of his frustration with 
the severity of the guideline sentences. See Dalia Lithwick, Jack Weinstein, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2010), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/11/jack-weinstein/308273 [https://perma.cc/4JMP-
FMMY]. For a discussion, see David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1283, 1322 (1995). 
179. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (holding unconstitutional a section of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act permitting one House of Congress to veto an executive-branch decision to allow a 
deportable alien to remain in the United States because such action was legislative in nature). 
180. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 273, 288 (1993). 
181. For an example of a comparable delegation in wartime, see Yakus v. United States, 321 
U.S. 414 (1944), which found constitutional the delegation of power to set prices to an executive-branch 
“Price Administrator” under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942; under the Act, the Administrator 
reviewed prices to ensure that they were “fair and equitable.” 
182. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). As Miriam Seifter has explained, 
“most states—to the envy of Presidents—have retained the item veto, allowing governors to revise 
certain statutes before they become law.” Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 483, 508 (2017). 
183. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (2010). 
184. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448. 
185. Id. at 449. 
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legislature and executive had hoped to use to oversee agency action and 
discipline the size of the bureaucracy. The Court’s rejection of the one-house 
vote had a similar effect. Both tools were eliminated, but once again, even 
successful separation of powers claims did not cut back the administrative state. 
If anything, they have empowered it. 
At any rate, the point is not that constitutional doctrine never vindicates 
separation of powers concerns, but rather that vindications are surpassingly 
rare. 
III. The Actual Practice of Separation of Powers Merits Matters 
There is still more that can be said about the relationship between the 
separation of powers and the administrative state. I obtained every case in the 
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit that raised separation of powers concerns 
in the past two decades to see where the doctrines fit today. I reviewed this data 
to reduce the risk of cherry-picking the risk that the cases that I and others 
deem “important” might obscure the true weight of actual practice. 
Political scientists have built two data sets on the Supreme Court; one 
includes every case decided by the Court, and the other includes every 
challenge by a litigant to the constitutionality of a congressional enactment 
heard by the Supreme Court.186 I extracted all challenges to the constitutionality 
of federal statutes on separation of powers grounds.187 
Because there is no similar database for courts of appeal cases, I collected 
every case where Westlaw coded the D.C. Circuit as having engaged in a 
separation of powers analysis through its keynote system in the past twenty 
years.188 There are some limitations to this approach, but it is unlikely to miss 
any separation of powers case purporting to overrule a congressional statute.189 
As for the Supreme Court, it is easy to overstate how invested the modern 
Court is in separation of powers claims. Consider every case in which the 
Supreme Court entertained separation of powers claims since 1900. There have 
 
186. See Spaeth, supra note 169; Whittington, supra note 19. 
187. I used the Whittington database to build the database and checked it against the Spaeth 
database to ensure that there were not cases missed. To be sure, relying on political scientists to interpret 
legal doctrine correctly is a risk. Cases like Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018), which 
allowed military officers to serve in two adjudicatory roles and briefly discussed the Appointments 
Clause implications, could be included but are not. 
188. The search was 92xx! in the CTADC databased with a date restriction after 1/1/1998. 
189. The problem with relying on Westlaw’s classification system is that the system can be 
overinclusive and underinclusive. For example, the D.C. Circuit will often throw out appeals for a lack 
of standing. In resolving the standing question, the D.C. Circuit will sometimes cite a failure to meet the 
requirements of the standing test in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). But in 
other cases the court will go further and remind the parties that the standing doctrine, limiting the courts 
from hearing anything that is not a case or controversy, is a way of cabining the judiciary, and thus 
vindicates separation of powers values. Although the issue in both sets of cases is the same, Westlaw 
will only generate a headnote referencing the separation of powers in the second set of cases. 
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been 2 high-water marks, both periods with conservative ascendance at the 
Court. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Supreme Court considered 21 separation and 
powers claims, and—5 times in the 1920s, and 3 times in the 1930s—
vindicated those claims. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court entertained 
separation of powers claims 18 times per decade. In 10 of the cases in the 
1980s, it struck down a statute. But the bloom of separation of powers was 
coming off the rose quickly: in the 1990s the Court only granted relief to 
separation of powers plaintiffs 5 times. In the 2 decades since, the Court has 
heard fewer cases—13 since 2000—and taken action against a statute 7 times, 
as Figure 1 shows, although the remedy in these cases was limited in all but 
two cases, one involving the foreign affairs power, and one—the line-item veto 
case—plausibly involving the administrative state. In one case, the Court 
affirmed the sanction administered by an agency that it concluded was 




Figure 1. Separation of Powers Cases at the Supreme Court, 1900-Present 
 
The record is consistent with the narrative that the separation of powers is 
a set of doctrines beloved by those opposed to the growth of the regulatory 
state. The 1930s Court before the “switch in time that saved nine” was 
famously hostile to regulatory initiatives.190 In the 1980s and 1990s, the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts retrenched from a liberal era that lasted from the 1950s to 
the 1970s.191 During this liberal period—the Warren Court era—separation of 
powers claims were almost never made, and only in three cases ever vindicated. 
 
190. As Maxwell Stearns has put it, “In addition to the ‘Four Horsemen,’ as the four 
conservative justices were sometimes called, Justice Owen Roberts rather consistently sided with the 
conservatives against FDR’s New Deal initiatives.” Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: 
Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309, 462 (1995). 
191. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 104 n.11 (1989) 
(“Perhaps the Burger Court, though conservative in many of its rulings, will be regarded in history as a 
transitional Court from the liberal Warren Court to the even more conservative Rehnquist Court.”); 
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The curious thing about this judicial history is that the Court has retained 
its Rehnquist-era conservative majority in the past two decades and yet has 
heard far fewer separation and powers cases—and has struck down far fewer of 
them—than its predecessors. Separation of powers cases have fallen out of 
fashion. Moreover, Chevron deference, which blunts the courts’ power to 
review agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, has become well-
established.192 
In the past 20 years, the Supreme Court has considered 13 separation of 
powers challenges. Only 1 of these cases affected the administrative state, the 
line-item veto case (it also undid a bankruptcy court’s power to decide a state 
law counterclaim and a congressional effort to constrain the executive’s power 
to set passport eligibility standards). In 7 of those 13 cases, it outright rejected a 
separation of powers argument, as Table 1 shows. Nor does it appear that the 
decision not to hear separation of powers cases is based on a lack of 
opportunity: more briefs raising the issue at the certiorari stage were filed in the 
last decade than in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and more briefs 
were filed in that decade than in either the 1990s or the 1980s.193 
In three of the cases, the Court struck down the statute as applied, in 
which case its ordinary remedy was to remand the matter to the agency 
involved for reconsideration in light of the Court’s opinion. The importance of 
remand can vary. United States v. Hatter involved a question about whether 
obligating Article III judges to pay into Social Security and Medicare violated 
the Compensation Clause, which provides that federal judicial compensation 
may not be reduced while judges are in office. The Court allowed the Medicare 
taxes but struck down the Social Security taxes.194 In that case, the remand 
essentially directed the agency to refund the money wrongly taken from the 
 
Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some Republican Supreme 
Court Justices “Evolve” and Others Don’t?, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 457, 462 (2007) (positing that 
both conventional wisdom and voting patterns made the Burger Court relatively conservative, and the 
Rehnquist Court more conservative). 
192. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As 
Joshua Matz has said, Chevron deference is “[o]ne of the most important doctrines in administrative 
law—indeed, arguably in all of law.” Joshua Matz, The Imminent Demise of Chevron Deference?, TAKE 
CARE (June 21, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-imminent-demise-of-chevron-deference 
[https://perma.cc/MV2B-4QAL]. 
193. Or so a search of Westlaw’s Supreme Court Petitions for Certiorari database suggests. 
1651 briefs raising the “separation of powers” at the certiorari stage were filed between January 1, 2010 
and July 15, 2019. 1085 such briefs were filed between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2009. 623 
were filed in the 1990s and 140 in the 1980s. The implications of the briefing are limited—presumably 
Westlaw catalogued fewer certiorari briefs in the decades before the turn of the century. Nonetheless, it 
is not as if, in recent years, separation of powers questions were not raised in the certiorari docket. 
194. United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 561 (2001) (“The special retroactivity-related 
Social Security rules that Congress enacted in 1984, however, effectively singled out then-sitting federal 
judges for unfavorable treatment.”). 
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Article III judges, who won the case. The result constrained Congress’s taxing 
power, though not in a way that particularly threatened tax administration.195 
In Nguyen v. United States, the matter concerned a criminal appeal in 
which a territorial judge, appointed pursuant to Article IV of the Constitution, 
participated in the three-judge panel that affirmed a criminal conviction. The 
Court decided this was an encroachment on Article III. Getting a remand after 
being convicted of a crime is better than getting the conviction affirmed, one 
supposes, but Nguyen’s relief was hardly the stuff of exoneration. On remand, 
his criminal appeal was considered by a panel composed of three Article III 
judges, which again held that Nguyen should be convicted.196 
Only in Stern v. Marshall, discussed above in Section I.C, did the 
Supreme Court exercise its power to affect a more dramatic change in an 
administrative program.197 In that case, a bankruptcy court “exercised the 
judicial power of the United States by entering final judgment on a common 
law tort claim, even though the judges of such courts enjoy neither tenure 
during good behavior nor salary protection.”198 Remand in this matter 
presumably meant a remand to the bankruptcy court with an instruction not to 
decide the state-law counterclaim. This meant that one claimant to an estate 
with a bankruptcy-court judgment lost, and another claimant with a state-court 
judgment won—a rare example in which a separation of powers judgment 
really mattered to the parties in the case. Stern also cut back on a power 
claimed by an administrative program—the bankruptcy process could not, it 
appeared, decide state-law counterclaims over the objection of one of the 
parties as part of its efforts to resolve all of the claims of all of the creditors of a 
bankrupt estate. 
However, only a few years later, the Court walked back much of the 
implications of Stern by allowing the parties to consent to have bankruptcy 
courts resolve state-law counterclaims, giving the courts the power to decide 
the sort of matters found to be beyond their power only a few years before.199 
Three other cases struck down congressionally approved statutes on their 
face. Here too, however, a “successful” facial challenge means different things 
in different contexts. One, Clinton v. City of New York, took the line-item veto 
away from Congress and the President forever, as we saw above. The other two 
 
195. See, e.g., Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Tax: Different, Not Exceptional, 71 
ADMIN. L. REV. 663, 665 (2019); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
465, 466 (2013); Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 
1901 (2014). 
196. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 71 (2003). For the opinion on remand, which did 
vacate some, but not all. of the charges for which Nguyen had been originally convicted, see United 
States v. Nguyen, 113 F. App’x 252, 255 (9th Cir. 2004). 
197. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 469 (2011). 
198. Id. 
199. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015). 
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cases had almost no impact on the administrative state.200 Free Enterprise Fund 
resolved a technical Appointments Clause question in a technical way that left 
unaffected the unconstitutional decision-maker and left in place the sanction 
against the plaintiffs.201 Zivotofsky v. Kerry affirmed presidential control over 
foreign relations by voiding a statute that obligated the executive branch to 
issue passports to American citizens born in Israel in a particular way.202 
The Supreme Court, in sum, has been willing to entertain separation of 
powers claims but has rarely authorized a remedy that has constrained 
regulators in the past two decades. The D.C. Circuit is no different. 
I collected all D.C. Circuit cases with separation of powers headnotes in 
the past two decades. Of the forty-two cases, eight vindicated separation of 
powers arguments. But the federal courts only offered defendants much relief 
in a select few of these cases; in half of them, the panel that entertained the 
structural argument was reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court, as Table 2 
in the Appendix shows. 
The remaining cases hardly suggest a separation of powers revolution in 
the nation’s most important administrative-law court. In QUALCOMM, Inc. v. 
FCC, the court held that an agency could not modify a prior order that was 
currently under consideration by the court of appeals. To do so would encroach 
upon the court’s jurisdiction over the dispute—a matter of federal court 
jurisdiction more than one of administrative law.203 In Rawls Corp. v. CFIUS, 
the court considered the due-process implications of the designation of a 
foreign-owned firm as hostile to national-security interests by the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The separation of powers 
was implicated because the government argued that a CFIUS designation was a 
political question charged to the other branches and nonjusticiable by the 
courts.204 When Zivotofsky was before the D.C. Circuit, the court defended the 
President’s power to issue passports in the manner of his choosing despite a 
statute attempting to force his hand with regard to American citizens born in 
Israel.205 Every other case in which a panel of the DC Circuit invoked the 
separation of powers to overrule a statute was reversed either by the court 
sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. 
 
200. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (holding that “the cancellation 
procedures set forth in the Act violate the Presentment Clause”). 
201. Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010) (holding that “multilevel 
protection from removal is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President”). 
202. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1059 (2015). 
203. QUALCOMM Inc. v. FCC., 181 F.3d 1370, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
204. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(positing that the political-question doctrine, which the court decided did not matter for the resolution of 
the dispute, was rooted in separation of powers concerns). 
205. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d sub 
nom. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 192. 
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Lower courts are not always the place to see novel or idiosyncratic 
constitutional claims vindicated, but the record is still striking. The most 
important administrative-law court is almost entirely uninterested in separation 
of powers claims on the merits. When it does embrace such a claim, it never 
does so when an administrative program is at risk. And when an administrative 
program is at risk—for example, as in PHH Corp. v. CFPB—the remedy is 
modest to the point of nonexistence.206 Figure 2 shows how rare successful 




Figure 2. Separation of Powers Cases, 1998-2018 
 
To be sure, a comprehensive approach—reviewing every decision—is a 
useful check, but not a definitive one. Sometimes the outlier decisions really 
are the important ones, and sometimes a doctrinal advancement may be made 
in a case in which the merits go the other way. Marbury v. Madison, after all, 
was a case in which the executive branch won the dispute, but thereafter was 
subjected to judicial review.207 Win-rates are not everything.208 Moreover, 
relying on headnotes to build a set of cases from the D.C. Circuit could be both 
over- and underinclusive, given that judges sometimes discuss doctrines 
without really applying them to the case at hand, and sometimes apply 
doctrines without discussing them in the opinion. Standing cases exemplify this 
issue: sometimes a court will remind readers that the Article III standing 
doctrine is rooted in the separation of powers, so that courts are not making 
decisions that belong to other parts of the government, and sometimes it will 
apply a standing analysis without citing the separation of powers at all.209 The 
same problems apply to relying on political scientists to analyze legal doctrines, 
 
206. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (2016) (challenging the independence of the CFPB on 
separation of powers grounds). 
207. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
208. “Litigation loss may, counterintuitively, produce winners.” Douglas NeJaime, Winning 
Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945 (2011). 
209. See supra note 189. 
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although legal scholars have generally made their peace with the Spaeth 
database (the Whittington database has not, to my knowledge, been used by 
legal scholars before this Article).210 
IV. Separation of Powers Realism 
Why, if the government has violated the separation of powers, is the relief 
such weak tea? 
The problem with constitutional remedies is twofold. First, they are too 
big to succeed. Taken literally, they would require dismantling vast government 
apparatuses. Second, relatedly, they are intensely counter-majoritarian. They 
are strong medicine, and the courts have reasonably concluded that there is 
little need to take it when there are adequate, even better ways to put the 
administrative state through its paces. The claim here is that the increasingly 
settled and predictable world of Chevron deference has led the judiciary to turn 
away from separation of powers cases on the merits, and to strangle the few 
successful ones when it comes to providing a remedy. It would be better for the 
courts to make this clear: the separation of powers is about policing technical 
violations of clear constitutional rules, not about entertaining sweeping 
functional challenges to the administrative state. 
A. The Bull in the China Shop 
Even though four Justices of the Supreme Court pined for the 
reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine in Gundy v. United States, they 
must face up to the uncertainties that this reinvigoration could wreak upon the 
system.211 Nicolas Bagley worried that a reinvigoration of the doctrine could 
“call . . . into question the whole project of modern American governance.” 
And he is one to something.212 
Separation of powers claims so often fail because of what Laurence Tribe 
has characterized as the “settled expectations” check on the logic of 
constitutional law and that I call the part-of-the-furniture doctrine.213 Where an 
institution has been accepted in almost all corners of the Washington 
establishment and has been making policy for many years, few benefit from its 
sudden disappearance. Businesses find it difficult to plan against the prospect 
 
210. See id. 
211. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
212. Nicolas Bagley, Most of the American Government Is Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html 
[https://perma.cc/BXZ8-BXVQ]. 
213. This “doctrine” is entirely my invention. It might be considered a precautionary principle 
for Supreme Court Justices, and it helps to explain why the Court might find, for example, that prayer to 
open legislative sessions is not inconsistent with the First Amendment prohibition against the 
establishment of religion. See Serpentfoot v. Rome City Comm’n, 426 Fed. App’x 884 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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of dramatic changes to their regulatory environment. Further, judicial decisions 
that remove regulatory protections that the public has come to rely upon puts 
the popular legitimacy of the judiciary to the test. 
Along these lines, courts also might resist implementing elaborate 
separation of powers remedies because of the burdens of enforcing them. If in 
some cases, an agency could theoretically be struck out of existence with the 
stroke of a pen, in other cases—undoing a complex bankruptcy restricting in 
Puerto Rico, for example, or invalidating every decision made by ALJs who 
were not appointed by the heads of the agencies for which they work. 
The point is a realist one—the opposite of arguing that if the doctrine 
requires something, then that is what judges must do, regardless of the 
consequences. Instead, in separation of powers cases, judges have proven time 
and again that they attend to the consequences very carefully and are 
increasingly unwilling to do much to vindicate the functional implications of 
the doctrines. This sort of realism is consistent with Orin Kerr’s account of the 
Supreme Court’s approach to the Fourth Amendment and Jack Balkin’s view of 
how change happens in constitutional law.214 Moreover, this Article is not 
alone in making a realist analysis in this field. As Adrian Vermeule recently 
observed of the nondelegation doctrine, “One suspects that as the stakes 
increase in future cases, as the consequences of casting the fifth vote to 
destabilize the administrative state focus the judicial mind . . . the likelihood of 
invalidation will fall correspondingly.”215 
We can see the importance of settled expectations in the blowback to a 
recent decision by a district-court judge to hold the entire Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) to be unconstitutional.216 The decision prompted the Washington Post to 
conclude that the ruling “could create major disruptions across the U.S. health-
care system—affecting which drugs patients can buy, preventive services for 
older Americans, the expansion of Medicaid in most states and the structure of 
the Indian Health Service.”217 
 
214. Jack M. Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial 
Review in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215 (2019); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-
Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) (noting that “[w]hen 
new tools and new practices threaten to expand or contract police power in a significant way, courts 
adjust the level of Fourth Amendment protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium,” and  
“[g]enerational shifts in views about judicial activism and judicial restraint mirror the rise and fall of 
political regimes”). On the other hand, there are those who think that the separation of powers also 
evolves, in usually useful ways. As Jon Michaels has put it, “fashioning yet another—a tertiary—system 
of rivalrous checks and balances seems to be a normatively and constitutionally necessary precondition 
to legitimizing these currently concentrated and unencumbered exercises of political-commercial 
power.” Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring— Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 523 
(2015) (emphasis omitted).  
215. Adrian Vermeule, Never Jam Today, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 20, 
2019), https://yalejreg.com/nc/never-jam-today-by-adrian-vermeule [https://perma.cc/LT4L-QZF6]. 
216. Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
217. Legal Experts Rip Judge’s Rationale for Declaring Obamacare Unconstitutional, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-experts-rip-
 
09. ZARING ARTICLE. FINAL 5/31/2020 11:19 PM 
Toward Separation of Powers Realism 
747 
The decision was a based on a view that Congress had exceeded its 
constitutional powers. A prior Supreme Court opinion concluded that the ACA 
requirement that all Americans purchase health insurance—the “individual 
mandate”—would be unconstitutional under the Interstate Commerce Clause 
but constitutional under the Tax Power because it triggered a tax for 
noncompliers.218 In 2017, Congress eliminated the tax in its Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act.219 This led the judge to conclude that the tax power could no longer justify 
the mandate. “Because the Individual Mandate continues to mandate the 
purchase of health insurance, it remains unsustainable under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.”220 Moreover, because the individual mandate was 
“essential” to the act, the rest of the act was unconstitutional as well. “The 
individual mandate is so interwoven with the ACA’s regulations that they 
cannot be separated. None of them can stand,” the judge concluded.221 
This dramatic remedy provoked a dramatic response. “Millions of people 
now rely on Obamacare’s subsidies and rules, which argues against judges 
repealing the law by fiat,” the conservative Wall Street Journal’’s editorial 
board complained.222 Robert Verbruggen, a similarly conservative writer on the 
National Review bemoaned “destroying a huge piece of legislation on such 
reasoning.”223 The Washington Post’s and New York Times’s editorial boards 
also decried the decision.224 The Fifth Circuit has reversed the district court’s 
severability analysis in the wake of this criticism, offering yet another example 




218. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
219. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
220. Texas, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 585. 
221. Id. at 615. There are some pedestrian problems with the opinion. The decision to throw 
out the entire statute for problems with the individual mandate makes little sense, given that the statute 
makes a large number of interventions into the health insurance industry, many of which are unrelated to 
the individual mandate. The statute—among many other things—expanded Medicaid eligibility and 
provided for testing programs for cost-saving measures, neither of which has much to do the 
requirement to purchase health insurance. 
222. Editorial, An Obamacare Blunder, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-obamacare-blunder-11544996418 [https://perma.cc/T7GB-8S69]. 
223. Robert Verbruggen, Don’t Cheer (or Panic) Over That Obamacare Ruling, NAT’L REV. 
(Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/dont-cheer-or-panic-over-that-obamacare-
ruling [https://perma.cc/7B4E-NUHA]. 
224. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler & Abbe R. Gluck, What the Lawless Obamacare Ruling 
Means, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/opinion/obamacare-ruling-
unconstitutional-affordable-care-act.html [https://perma.cc/3UR8-U3WM] (noting that the case is “not 
based on a solid legal argument” and characterizing the decision as “an exercise in raw judicial power). 
225. As the Fifth Circuit explained, “All together, these observations highlight the need for a 
careful, granular approach to carrying out the inherently difficult task of severability analysis in the 
specific context of this case. We are not persuaded that the approach to the severability question set out 
in the district court opinion satisfies that need.” Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 397 (5th Cir. 
2019). 
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B. The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty 
Though some judges can, sometimes, invoke the separation of powers to 
lay waste to portions of the administrative state, many others—including the 
current Chief Justice—have been unwilling to strike down signature legislative 
accomplishments on facially plausible legal grounds that might even accord 
with their policy preferences. For the Affordable Care Act, the Court made this 
explicit in King v. Burwell. It reasoned: 
 
In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those chosen by the 
people. . . . [I]n every case we must respect the role of the Legislature, and take 
care not to undo what it has done. . . . If at all possible, we must interpret the Act 
in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter.226 
 
Congress, in other words, should get the benefit of the doubt in 
constitutional litigation. Courts do not accord agencies the same charity. 
Although agencies are entitled to deference, signature administration priorities 
at the EPA or SEC get struck down regularly. Some took the Court’s decision 
in King v. Burwell as a realist commitment not to eviscerate a signature 
achievement of the Obama-era Congress and administration. 
Courts must always wrestle with their countermajoritarian difficulties. 
Promulgating statutes is hard work, particularly these days. It takes agreement 
from the majority of 435 elected members of the House of Representatives, the 
concurrence of a majority of 100 senators, and the assent of the President. The 
window for the passage of legislation, given the difficulties involved in 
building legislative coalitions these days, is narrow—during the Obama and 
Trump administrations, the first 2 years of the presidencies presented both 
presidents with their only possible opportunities for legislative success.227  
When unelected judges undo that work, the democratic-deficit concerns 
become acute, and the reasons for the intervention have to be better than merely 
plausible. Theoretical concerns about constraints on the ability of Congress to 
delegate powers, or to limit the President’s or Congress’s ability to interfere 
with the agencies to which those powers have been delegated, are hard to 
square with the overwhelming numerical and process advantages that go the 
other way. 
Finally, courts must think about their own powers. If this Article has 
shown the difficulties courts have in providing remedies to separation of 
 
226. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 988 (2015). 
227. See generally Niall McCarthy, Historically, The President's Party Performs Poorly In 
The Midterms, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/10/09/
historically-the-presidents-party-performs-poorly-in-the-midterms-infographic/#31679c066732 
[https://perma.cc/A4LX-UQ8H] (discussing the historical trend of the president’s party losing power in 
the midterm elections).  
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powers victims, others have shown how the executive branch can evade 
doctrinal efforts to invigorate the separation of powers in non-administrative 
state contexts.228 And more generally, as Andrew Coan has observed, the 
Supreme Court in particular is constrained by its capacity—it must not bring on 
more litigation than it can handle.229 
C. The Administrative-Law Alternative 
Courts have turned away from separation of powers remedies because the 
remedies, if taken seriously, would be overpowered and undemocratic, but also 
because they know that there is a less intrusive alternative out there. It is review 
through the APA, a review that scrutinizes at the retail, rather than wholesale, 
level. 
Consider Chevron—the most written about case in administrative law—
which provides the rules of the road for APA review.230 Chevron sets forth the 
standard courts should apply to an agency’s interpretations of the statute it has 
been charged with administering, when those interpretations are made in an 
order imbued with the force of law.231 The standard of review under Chevron 
consists of two steps. For the first step, the reviewing court must ask whether, 
after “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” it is evident that 
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”232 If so, the 
statute is “unambiguous” and the agency must not differ from Congress’s 
clearly expressed command.233 
If, however, the court decides that the statute is ambiguous, it then moves 
to step two of the inquiry. That step requires the court to uphold the agency’s 
interpretation so long as it is “based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”234 Appellate courts have interpreted this to require deference to any 
reasonable interpretation of the statute offered by the agency.235 
 
228. Non administrative, but closely related to it. As Aziz Huq has argued, even after some 
lauded decisions holding the national security presidency to account for its extra-territorial detentions, 
“federal courts played a minor role aiding the President--and arguably did more to entrench rather than 
to dissolve the prison doors at Guantánamo.” Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. 
L. REV. 499, 507 (2017). 
229. ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION (2019). 
230. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
231. Id. at 843. The contours of when, precisely, to apply Chevron are complex, and beyond 
the scope of this Article. But roughly, we know that it does apply when the agency is acting with force 
of law, and the more formal the action the better. The when-Chevron-applies inquiry has been most 
definitively explored by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 
(2001). 
232. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.9. 
233. Id. at 844. 
234. Id. at 843. 
235. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (describing how Chevron had been applied in circuit 
courts). 
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All of this is familiar enough, but one advantage of Chevron is that it 
makes the APA review process more tractable. After seeing enough 
applications of Chevron, one learns, for example, that technical environmental 
rules are likely to get deference,236 and politically sensitive issues related to 
controversial statutes are not.237 One would learn that Chevron is no paper 
tiger; courts reverse agencies approximately one third of the time—Congress, it 
turns out, does sometimes speak directly and agencies do impermissibly 
construe their governing statutes.238 And one would learn that it is easy to 
overthink just how different the Chevron inquiry is from most of the other 
standards of review used in administrative law.239 All of these legally critical 
questions become much easier to answer once the words of the law are put in 
the context of experience. 
As it turns out, Chevron’s test for reasonableness subjects agency to a 
type of scrutiny they can plan around. Under Chevron, agencies are not to be 
watched like hawks and courts are supposed to assume that agency policy 
decisions are entitled to deference when administering statutes that do not offer 
clear guidance, even if the agency’s decision differs from the policy the court 
would otherwise think best.240 Finally, the ordinary remedy under the APA is 
remand, meaning that the agency can try again. 
All of this is reassuringly minimalist, which may well be good for 
refereeing the balance between administrative agencies and the industries they 
 
236. Although this might be changing. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA., 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) 
(finding EPA updates to its National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Program to be 
unentitled to deference based on a failure of the agency to consider costs of implementing the updated 
standards). 
237. For example, see King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 988 (2015), in which the Supreme Court 
interpreted the portion of the controversial ACA related to insurance subsidies on the exchanges created 
by the statute. The case turned on an IRS interpretation of the Act, but the Court elected not to provide 
Chevron deference to the agency interpretation. Id. at 2488-89 (explaining that Chevron deference “is 
premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the 
agency to fill in the statutory gaps. . . . In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate 
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation”); see also Encino Motorcars, 
LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (“An arbitrary and capricious regulation of this sort is 
itself unlawful and receives no Chevron deference.”). 
238. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010) (arguing that the 
various standards of review in administrative law can best be understood as inquiries into the 
reasonableness of the agency’s action; observing that under most of them the agency wins 2/3s of the 
cases brought for judicial review). 
239. See id. But see Kent Barnett & Christopher Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts 116 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (finding that “there was nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in 
agency-win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevron deference than when they did not”). 
240. See Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012) (the agency’s “position 
prevails if it is a reasonable construction of the statute, whether or not it is the only possible 
interpretation or even the one a court might think best”). Some would classify these cases as related to 
the separation of powers, as they delineate between agency and judicial powers. See, e.g., Pauley v. 
Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1991) 
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regulate.241 But judicial review can go further than Chevron, even 
controversially so, while avoiding the thicket of constitutional provocation. 
Obtaining rulings, as industries occasionally have done, requiring agencies to 
conduct extensive cost-benefit analyses before passing rules really does limit 
regulatory power—even if the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) already requires some cost-benefit analysis.242 For example, challenges 
to cost-benefit analyses have substantially slowed SEC rulemaking, taking 
advantage of statutory requirements for the SEC to consider the effects of its 
rules on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.243 One court has 
interpreted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act to disrupt the government’s 
strategy for overseeing too-big-to-fail insurance companies and asset managers 
on similar grounds.244 Regulated industry, in other words, can win big without 
throwing the basis of some of the fundaments of the constitutional state into 
question. 
There is a second minimalist implication from the paucity of separation of 
powers remedies. Rational-basis review of legislation is much less rigorous 
than rational-basis review of regulation.245 
The better luck plaintiffs have under the APA is, perhaps, unsurprising. 
While many jurists believe that legislative history is unimportant when 
interpreting statutes, any agency’s proffered reasons for new regulations are 
parsed much more carefully.246 Under the APA, agencies must engage in 
reasoned decision-making; Congress must meet the barest shadow of such 
requirement.247 
 
241. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1996) 
(considering whether “minimalism . . . is self-consciously connected with the liberal principle of 
legitimacy”). 
242. See Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 369 (2019) 
(pronouncing caution over the overuse of cost-benefit analysis). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (“[A]ny decision not to 
quantify costs and benefits, or to show that the latter justify the former, does require some kind of 
explanation.”). 
243. For a discussion of this litigation, see Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries 
for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 290 (2013). 
244. Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 224 (D.D.C. 2016). 
245. As for rational review, as the Ninth Circuit has put it, “the legislature’s decision to 
remove certain . . . requirements that it no longer deems essential . . . is a rational and quintessentially 
legislative decision.” Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Merrick B. 
Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV L. REV. 505, 532 (1985) (discussing judicial 
review of agency decisionmaking, which, as with congressional legislation, evaluates an agency 
decision under the rational-basis test and accords it “great deference”). For a discussion, see David 
Zaring, The Federal Deregulation of Insurance, 97 TEX. L. REV. 125, 161 (2018). 
246. As the Supreme Court has put it, an agency must be able to show that its policy is “the 
product of reasoned decision-making.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983). 
247. “Rational basis review is the default level of scrutiny that gives immense deference to 
Congress and is very easy for the government to satisfy.” Rick Zou, Stateless in the United States: The 
United Nations’ Efforts to End Statelessness and American Gender Discrimination in Lynch v. Morales-
Santana, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 103 (2016). 
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D. A Better Approach to Separation of Powers 
Separation of powers challenges are being raised and entertained more 
now than they have been in the past. But those plaintiffs are wasting their 
money and the time of the judiciary. The courts would be better served by 
announcing a new approach. Formal technical violations of the separation of 
powers doctrines that do appear in the Constitution—appointments, 
bicameralism and presentment, and the like—could be policed: these clauses 
should not be read out of the document. But functional claims—that a regulator 
is acting too much like the legislature, or that the legislature is trammeling too 
much on the powers of the presidency, or that a regulator looks too much like a 
court—should probably dismissed as nonjusticiable. Let the separation of 
powers become a technical doctrine of agency construction, not an existential 
threat to the modern state, which does not need such a threat from its judicial 
branch. 
Functional separation of powers doctrines include the nondelegation 
doctrine and the “this is just too much” doctrine, which prevents insulation of 
independent agencies from executive control. No longer would courts have to 
decide whether midlevel agency officials are “inferior officers” or “mere 
employees.” Under this regime, layers of for-cause removal protections would 
be permitted—who is harmed if an accounting board that reports to the SEC is 
not removable for any reason by the President? But the placement of 
congressional officials on agency boards, or violations of the Bicameralism 
Clause could be rejected. 
Conclusion 
It is a good thing that the courts are disinclined to undo the administrative 
state through separation of powers jurisprudence. Separation of powers 
litigation does, however, waste time and attention that could be directed to 
more useful tasks. If there is no right without a remedy, perhaps courts should 
spend less time vindicating rights only to traduce them when it comes to 
finding a cure. One way to do this would be to explicitly abandon efforts to 
reinvigorate functional separation of powers inquiries. 
For the foregoing reasons, we should assume that the new vogue for 
separation of powers claims is—appropriately—a false dawn. The 
administrative state needs a judicial check, but it has that check in ordinary 
administrative law, which explains why the judiciary has been so consistently 
unwilling to swing the separation of powers wrecking ball. 
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Table 1. Separation of Powers Cases in the Supreme Court: 1998-2019248 
 
Case Subject Effect 
Limit on 
Remedy 
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) Standing Upheld - 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417 (1998) 








of Injunction  
Upheld - 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 
531 U.S. 457 (2001) 
Nondelegation Upheld - 









Khanh Phoung Nguyen v. United 








Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 
















Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif, 
575 U.S. _ (2015) 














248. Whittington, supra note 19. 
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Case Subject Effect 
Limit on 
Remedy 







Oil States Servs. v. Greene’s Energy 









Table 2. Separation of Powers Cases in the D.C. Circuit: 1998-2019249 
 




Saco River Cellular, Inc. 
v. FCC, 133 F.3d 25 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) 
  
FCC FCC Order 
Revision 
Upheld - 
In re Papandreou, 139 
F.3d 247 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) 





LaShawn A. by Moore 
v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) 









Laughlin v. NLRB, 148 
F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) 
  
NLRB Agency Bias Upheld - 
Bellsouth Corp. v. FCC, 









249. Source: Data collected from Westlaw headnotes 92xx. 
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QUALCOMM Inc. v. 
FCC, 181 F.3d 1370 










McBryde v. Comm. to 
Review Circuit Council 
Conduct & Disability 
Orders of Judicial Conf. 
of U.S., 264 F.3d 52 





United States v. Wilson, 






In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 
1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 




Cobell v. Norton, 392 








Schneider v. Kissinger, 
412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) 
  
White House Foreign Policy Upheld - 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 







United States v. Pollard, 







Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. 
v. Sec’y of State, 444 






Bancoult v. McNamara, 
445 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) 
  
White House Political 
Question 
Upheld - 
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Whatley v. District of 
Columbia, 447 F.3d 814 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) 
  




Jung v. Ass’n of Am. 
Med. Colleges, 184 F. 








Nat. Res. Def. Council 
v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1 
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